The surprise Hamas attack on 7 October that killed hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians and saw several dozen more taken hostage raises the question of its impact on China’s growing diplomatic and economic equities in the Middle East. In the short term, it will certainly complicate the “wave of reconciliation” sweeping the region that China is so fond of taking credit for. Fundamentally, however, little seems likely to change for China’s relations with Middle East states. It is unlikely, for instance, that China will adopt positions that could upset its carefully constructed network of economic partnerships with nearly all of the states in the region—a unique achievement. Given the potential threat to China’s achievement, Beijing can hardly be expected to look kindly on any role Iran might have played in the attack, if evidence of such a role emerges. Not that most regional elites were really looking to China as a guarantor of peace in the first place. Rather, they welcomed its trade and investment as a counterbalance to outsized American influence, while at the same time looking to Washington rather than Beijing for their security umbrella.
China Wades In
The initial statement on the Hamas attack by China’s foreign ministry underscored the diplomatic minefield Beijing must navigate:
China is deeply concerned over the current escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel. We call on relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint and immediately end the hostilities to protect civilians and avoid further deterioration of the situation.
The recurrence of the conflict shows once again that the protracted standstill of the peace process cannot go on. The fundamental way out of the conflict lies in implementing the two-state solution and establishing an independent State of Palestine. The international community needs to act with greater urgency, step up input into the Palestine question, facilitate the early resumption of peace talks between Palestine and Israel, and find a way to bring about enduring peace. China will continue to work relentlessly with the international community towards that end.
There are two elements to the statement worth paying attention to. First, it is aggressively neutral. It explicitly avoids condemnation of either side. The second half re-affirms China’s commitment to the international consensus of a two-state solution and an independent Palestinian state. Taken together, it’s a statement that reflects the balancing act that China has continually attempted to play in the Middle East, between its political interest in supporting the Palestinian cause and its relatively robust economic relationship with Israel. While China does occasionally speak more emphatically in support of the Palestinians in their diplomatic efforts, its reaction to the use of violence tends to be more muted, and in that respect the statement is fairly typical of Chinese foreign ministry responses to these kinds of situations.
Typical or not, it has not been enough to satisfy Israel or the United States. Yuval Waks, a senior official at the Israeli embassy in Beijing, said on Sunday that Israel expected to see a “stronger condemnation” of Hamas from China due to the friendly relationship between the two countries. “When people are being murdered, slaughtered in the streets, this is not the time to call for a two-state solution.” Perhaps in response, China’s foreign mInistry spokesperson Mao Ning added on Monday that “China is deeply concerned about the continued escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” and “regrets the civilian casualties caused by the conflict,” and that “China opposes and condemns actions that cause harm to civilians.”
The Benefits of Righteous Non-Commitment
Still, the main audience on China’s mind is likely not Washington or Jerusalem, but rather the many Middle Eastern states with which China has a substantial and growing relationship. Its relationship with Israel is robust and economically significant, providing China with important access to R&D resources and technology, although it has seen many setbacks recently in the face of growing U.S. pressure on Israel to temper its relations with Beijing. It also has substantial diplomatic ties to Palestinian civil organizations, providing the PLO with diplomatic support and bolstering its legitimacy as an organization recognized by major international powers. Although genuine support for the Palestinian cause was often in short supply, it was important politically to at least be rhetorically in favor of justice for Palestinians, a position of righteous noncommitment palatable to both Israel and Arab states. More recently, when even Saudi Arabia is considering normalized relations with Israel, this measured neutrality puts China on the same page as its Arab allies.
Once Upon a Time …
… China proposed (repeatedly) a set of vague, over-hyped talking points referred to grandiosely as Xi Jinping’s “Four-Point Plan for Peace.” In the jubilant aftermath of China’s successful mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, many analysts and regional commentators were asking themselves whether Beijing would be able to have a positive impact on other regional conflicts.
Unfortunately for those who wished to see a Chinese-brokered Israel-Palestine settlement, there is little to no chance—if there ever was one—that China could now play any substantial role in this or any other conflict involving Israel for the foreseeable future. Thus, Beijing faces the contradiction between its self-portrayal as a Middle East peacemaker and its actual capacity to perform that function. We should hardly be surprised that there are American, not Chinese, warships sitting off the coast of Tel Aviv today. We had always noted that reality; it is only because the situation has unfolded in such a violent and dramatic fashion that this contradiction has been made so clearly evident.
Drum Roll … the Iran Connection?
One question on the minds of China watchers and Iran observers alike surrounds the possibility of Iranian involvement in the operation. The arguments for and against are well known. But even if Iran were implicated, it’s not clear that there would be much China could do. In the event that it led to a breach between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China would undoubtedly offer itself once more as a mediator and try to salvage the agreement, but the question of leverage is a trickier one. When it comes to Saudi Arabia, it has nearly no leverage at all. It is not about to pull out of its massive recent investments in Saudi Arabia’s oil resources and economic expansion efforts, which are an important part of its long-term overseas strategy. Beyond that, there is little in terms of credible threats that could be made, and China historically has not been willing to use its economic relationship as leverage in these kinds of negotiations. There is a bit more leverage to be had in Iran, where the Iranian government is still looking to obtain Chinese investment, but again, all China can do is threaten to continue to not provide what it already hasn’t provided—not much of a threat. In reality, China would probably have little it could do but attempt to save face by washing its hands of the incident, claiming it tried its best, and laying the responsibility on its local partners. After all, official Chinese policy, which has served it so well as it has built its network of economic relationships, is not to interfere in the sovereign affairs of other states.
But that’s what the Game of Nations has historically been all about. Will Beijing reverse the trend and show that it’s possible to have your geopolitical cake and eat it too?
