With the cease-fire in Gaza having collapsed and the Israeli offensive continuing, China has maintained a balanced stance that offers diplomatic support to the Palestinians, but little else beyond humanitarian aid. At the same time, China held its highest-level official meeting with Iran since the outbreak of the war, but with no public mention of any controversial political issues. The 14th Iran-China Friendship Association meeting was laser-focused on economic issues and improving bilateral cooperation and, as usual, produced little in terms of concrete proposals or commitments from Beijing.
China Continues Diplomatic Push Amid Ceasefire Collapse
Chinese officials struck a slightly moderate tone this week, continuing to call for negotiation and refusing to condemn either side openly, although the language of official statements still implicitly criticizes the Israeli response. In a message to the UN-organized International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People observed on 29 November, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized that Beijing “has always firmly supported the just cause of the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights,” and that “the international community should increase development and humanitarian assistance to Palestine” and “convene a more authoritative international peace conference as soon as possible.” His words echoed the language of the official statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Thursday, 30 November, titled “China’s position paper on the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.”
The document condemned the deaths of civilians, called for an immediate cease-fire and humanitarian aid, and the implementation of a two-state solution to “comprehensively” and “justly” resolve the Palestinian issue. Its five points include a roadmap for action at the United Nations, including: 1) a comprehensive ceasefire and cessation of the war; 2) protection against “all violent attacks against civilians,” including a ban on “forced relocation” and an “early release of all detained civilians and hostages”; 3) guarantees of humanitarian relief; 4) an increase in diplomatic mediation; and 5) the continued search for a political “two-state solution” with an “independent Palestine with full sovereignty based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.” This statement does not directly condemn or even refer to either side as the belligerent party, although its content clearly places the resolution of Palestinian grievances as the primary goal of any just peace process, and the bulk of the references are to the humanitarian crisis caused by Israel’s response to the 7 October attack.
Ultimately, China’s response may produce positive commentary about Beijing’s principled stance, but the content shows little of substance that might actually impact the course of the conflict. China has consistently called for negotiations for decades, but hasn’t put any economic pressure on Israel to come to the negotiating table, nor is it obvious that such an attempt would even work. Calling on action in the UNSC is good on paper, but in practice, Beijing is well aware that Washington will veto any action it views as contrary to Israel’s security interests.
Chinese Media: We Told You So
The Chinese media maintained a strong focus on the war in Gaza this week as the ceasefire collapsed, returning to frequent live coverage of the numbers of civilians killed and dramatic images of injured civilians. This time, their coverage was not as strongly in contrast with coverage in Western media, as the U.S. and other nations have become increasingly critical of the Israeli response. One article reflected on this fact, writing that calls for a ceasefire had become “the mainstream voice of the international community” and that even “the United States, Israel’s main supporter, began to weaken its support for Israel” due to being “criticized by the international community for being too biased towards Israel.” However, despite U.S. pressure and the desire of both sides to negotiate in the short term, the author remained skeptical that a long-term solution would be easy. Both sides have a short-term preference to negotiate—Israel to secure the release of hostages and reduce domestic pressure, Hamas to regroup, recuperate, and allow assistance to reach the people of Gaza. But neither side can easily back down and will face difficulty reaching any conclusion. Therefore, the author concluded, the next stage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict “may be a stop-and-go situation.” Other articles paid close attention to the ongoing tensions between the U.S. navy and the Houthi movement in Yemen and other flashpoints in Syria and the Gulf that have potential to spill over into a wider conflict.
Iran and China: Friends or Acquaintances?
On 1 November, the Iran-China Friendship Association held its 14th annual conference in Tehran and hosted a semi-official delegation led by chairman of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Yang Wanming. The delegation met with several officials from the Iranian ministries of foreign affairs and tourism, as well as the municipality of Tehran, in hopes of bolstering development in tourism, trade, cultural, and economic ties, and (once again, with feeling!) implementing the 25-year Iran-China Agreement. China’s Ambassador to Iran, Chang Hua, gave a speech highlighting the developments in Iran-China relations over the last year, but they largely focused on cultural and diplomatic ties and the promotion of tourism. The conference concluded without the announcement of any major new initiatives.
Situation Normal
This perpetuation of the status quo suggests two important facts about China’s regional position and its relationship with Iran as the Israel-Gaza crisis unfolds. First, Beijing’s diplomacy and economic plans have been proceeding largely unimpeded since the conflict, indicating that Middle Eastern Arab states are either less interested in its role in Gaza than they are in the financial benefits of cozying up to China, or they are satisfied with China’s response (probably both). Second, it indicates that China is neither willing nor able to pressure Iran to “moderate” its support for Hamas, the Houthis, and other regional organizations hostile to Israel. At the same time, Beijing appears satisfied that Iran lacks the military and financial wherewithal to expand its influence or make trouble in a way that threatens its interests. And while Iran is likely satisfied with the absence of pressure, it is clearly dissatisfied that it lacks the leverage to encourage Beijing to treat it as more than a regional sideshow.
