For weeks, China has been voicing its concern about attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea carried out by Ansarullah, also known as the Houthi movement. Chairing an emergency meeting on 4 January of the UN Security Council on the “Red Sea Situation,” China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Geng Shuang said that ensuring the safety of global shipping ”not only contributes to maintaining regional peace and stability” but also “helps maintain global supply chain security and international trade order.” He called on “relevant parties to stop attacking and disturbing civilian ships” and to “respect and protect the freedom of navigation of all countries in the Red Sea waters.” But as the United States and the UK carry out retaliatory strikes on the Houthis, Beijing continues to call for a negotiated settlement, concerned that the U.S. response might further inflame tensions. And despite its growing regional influence and presence, it also seems that Beijing’s options are limited to expressing concern and asserting its goodwill as it plays to its Arab audience to score diplomatic points.
Spillover from the Gaza Conflict
Chinese officials continued to express concern about Yemen this week, emphasizing its connection to the conflict in Gaza and China’s efforts to call for a negotiated peace. Speaking from Egypt after a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed that the waters of the Red Sea “are an important international trade channel for goods and energy” and that China “calls for an end to harassment of civilian ships.” Furthermore, he said, “it must be emphasized that the tense situation in the Red Sea is a prominent manifestation of the spillover of the Gaza conflict. The top priority is to quell the war in Gaza as soon as possible to prevent the conflict from further expanding or even getting out of control.”
Wang unsurprisingly emphasizes China’s strength in the region, namely the goodwill it has generated from its stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict. China’s approach seems to be hitting the right notes when it comes to regional politics, at least according to Arab League General-Secretary Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who met with Wang the day before. Aboul Gheit said that the League “highly appreciates China’s upholding justice on the Palestinian issue and its important contributions to promoting a ceasefire, de-escalating the situation, and protecting civilians. We believe that China will continue to play an indispensable role.” Aboul Gheit also offered the “firm support” of the League for “the one-China principle and ‘one country, two systems’” and his opposition to Western “double standards” on human rights and Xinjiang, giving a glimpse of what China gets from these “mutually beneficial” relationships.
Adding Fuel to the Fire
Beijing clearly favors a controlled burn. As the U.S. conducts more military strikes in the region in response to attacks on its bases and international shipping, China has grown more concerned about a potential escalation. In a clear reference to the U.S. and UK response, Wang pointed out Monday that while China was deeply concerned about the situation, “at the same time, we believe that the Security Council has never authorized any country to use force against Yemen, and therefore one should avoid adding fuel to the tensions in the Red Sea and raising the overall regional security risks.” In the Chinese media, articles emphasized calls for restraint from the international community and the fact that the Houthis had declared that all U.S. and UK ships were legitimate targets. One article from Xinhua, entitled “Spillover from the Gaza Conflict Intensifies,” argued that “the U.S. and UK airstrikes not only do not help ease tensions in the Middle East, but may add fuel to the fire and make the regional situation more dangerous and complex.”
The Limits of China’s Influence
China has certainly made it clear to both Iran and the Houthis that they want the attacks to end, but they lack any real influence over Iran, which itself lacks the ability or motivation to restrain the Houthis. Nevertheless, given the ties between the Houthi movement and Iran, and the latter’s relationship with Beijing, there have been many attempts in Western media to link the two, despite the many degrees of separation. China has been very careful to avoid any direct links to the group, even going so far as to cancel a potential oil deal last year between Anton Oil Service and the Ansarullah-backed government, in part because Beijing fully supports the Saudi government. In fact, the growing strong ties with the Kingdom only reinforce Beijing’s desire to avoid being linked, even tangentially, to a destabilizing force in the region.
China tends to avoid getting involved in foreign military entanglements, and is unlikely to participate in or approve of any Western-led military efforts to remedy the situation, however uncomfortable it may be. To be sure, Beijing’s discomfort is driven by concern over potential damage to its commercial interests. But one suspects also that a wider conflict would reveal China’s military inadequacies and inability to project hard power in the region when compared to the West and even to regional players, such as Iran. That said, it remains to be seen whether “goodwill power” or “firepower” will ultimately carry the day.
