Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East was a decidedly mixed bag this week, as official news that Iran would join BRICS and had signed a major development project with a Chinese firm was partly overshadowed by ominous signs emerging from Yemen. Despite the “tidal wave of peace” that was supposed to be sweeping the region as a result of China’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, conflict in Yemen appears increasingly likely, as peace talks that began in the aftermath of the Beijing Agreement recently collapsed. What can we say about the success of China’s diplomacy in the region in light of these developments?
Iran Joins BRICS, Deepens Sino-Iranian Economic Connections
On 25 August, China officially announced that Iran would join the BRICS organization, alongside Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Mohammad Jamshidi, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian president for political affairs, said that Iran’s joining the BRICS cooperation was “a historic step” and “a strategic victory for Iran’s foreign policy.” Xi Jinping met with Ebrahim Ra’isi in Johannesburg to formalize the occasion, saying: “I am very glad that with the joint efforts of China, Iran and Saudi Arabia have achieved reconciliation, promoting security and stability in the Middle East.” Ra’isi praised China’s various global initiatives, saying: “The expansion of BRICS shows that unilateralism is on the decline. Iran is unswervingly determined to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership between Iran and China, and is willing to work together with China to further intensify comprehensive strategic cooperation…”
Coordination of Policy or Rhetoric?
The significance of Iran (and five other regionally significant countries) joining BRICS is difficult to assess at this stage. BRICS plays an important role in setting the agenda of the world financial system by articulating the demands of the largest developing economies, and adding more significant, oil-exporting countries will only allow it to do so more effectively. It also opposes the dominance of the dollar and supports trading in local currencies, a situation which would clearly benefit Iran with regard to U.S. sanctions. But in practice, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it remains more of a platform for coordination and rhetoric than it does a policy-setting organization, and its rhetoric in support of trading in local currencies has often fallen short of the policies of its members. Time will tell whether Iran joining BRICS brings any tangible benefits to either Iran or the BRICS organization.
Golestan Palace, or Bust
The Chinese media did not miss the opportunity to promote tourism to Iran, with features on sites like Golestan Palace, part of a larger effort to promote Chinese tourism in the Middle East. Additionally, Iran announced that a contract worth $2.7 billion had been awarded to an unnamed (almost certainly private, non-government owned) Chinese company for the development of the Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA). This is the latest in a series of investments China has made in the transportation infrastructure of the country, which undoubtedly will only help bolster the flow of tourists between China and the Middle East in years to come. Notably, the deal will be paid for not in dollars but in a bartered oil deal, likely in a bid to avoid U.S. sanctions.
China and the War in Yemen
The China-brokered deal to normalize relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been hailed as setting off a “wave of reconciliation” in the Middle East, particularly following the rehabilitation of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and hints of normalization between Iran and Egypt and between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But can it pave the way for a durable peace in Yemen? The Gulf nation has been entangled in a deadly military conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Iranian-backed Houthis, formally known as the “Supporters of God” or Ansarollah, who oppose the Saudi-backed government of Yemen, drawing on a mix of Shiite revivalism, Islamist anti-imperialism, and serious economic grievances against the Yemeni state. This war has inflicted immense costs upon Saudi Arabia, both in terms of finances and human lives, claiming over 350,000 casualties since 2015 and precipitating a severe humanitarian crisis. Although a ceasefire was eventually signed in 2022, the specter of renewed violence looms beneath the surface, and recent events have made a new round of violence increasingly likely. In this context, have China’s efforts to play peacemaker borne fruit?
All Politics is Local
This fundamentally boils down to two questions: to what extent did China’s influence shape the Iran-Saudi agreement, and how might the agreement influence the prospects of peace in Yemen? While China undeniably played a pivotal role in facilitating the agreement, it’s apparent that the foundations for this diplomatic step were laid by the involved states themselves, with their motives extending beyond the view of Beijing. Saudi Arabia’s interest in negotiating with Iran can be attributed, in part, to the escalating costs of the prolonged war and the dearth of tangible gains. The conflict had been severely straining Saudi Arabia’s coffers, imperiling the ambitious Vision 2030 project initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which is precisely why the ceasefire was signed in 2022. After seven years of relentless combat, the Houthi movement seemed entrenched, not weakened. The pivotal moment of Saudi Arabia’s inclination towards negotiations occurred when a major attack temporarily disrupted nearly half of the nation’s oil production. This event starkly exposed the shortcomings of Saudi strategy and the limitations of U.S. countermeasures against such drone-based assaults.
In short, it appears Saudi Arabia had come to realize it was losing the battle and sought an exit strategy before China’s involvement. While China’s role was instrumental in facilitating dialogue between the conflicting parties, it’s reasonable to assume that Saudi Arabia would have eventually sought to reduce its military involvement, even in the absence of external pressure.
Nobody Asked Our Opinion, Say Houthis
While the United Nations viewed the Iran-Saudi agreement as a potential harbinger of peace, nobody seems to have asked the Houthis, who were not involved at all in the negotiations in Beijing. A Houthi spokesperson emphasized that the solution to Yemen’s issues should stem from negotiations between Sanaa and Riyadh, not Tehran and Riyadh. Subsequent negotiations, initiated shortly after the agreement’s announcement, faltered as the Houthis declined to engage with the Saudi-appointed government in Sanaa. The Houthis labelled this government “mercenaries” of the Saudi coalition, refusing even the entreaties of both the United States and China. Although a fragile peace has been maintained to some extent, ominous signs of a potential resurfacing of violence linger. The Yemeni government has cautioned about potential Houthi military escalation, while the Houthis have hinted at reigniting civil unrest over unpaid salaries of civil servants.
China’s Influence Conditional
In essence, the core issues that could reignite conflict in Yemen remain largely impervious to China’s influence. The crux of Yemen’s turmoil is deeply rooted within the intricacies of local dynamics, encompassing issues beyond the ability of China or any external actor to directly influence. They are no more able to untie the knot of political and economic grievances in Yemen than the U.S. was able to do in Iraq or Afghanistan. These deep-seated challenges are intricately woven into the fabric of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, surpassing the scope of external mediation. The Houthis’ grievances, both political and economic, which initially fueled the conflict, have largely gone unaddressed. After a prolonged war of attrition against a well-armed, well-funded adversary, why would the Houthis relinquish their position and settle for anything less than their original political and economic demands? In the context of Yemen, as with Iran and Saudi Arabia, it seems that Beijing will once again be looking to exploit existing conditions as opposed to acting as a catalyst.
