As the dust settles (for now) in Gaza, U.S. and Chinese officials have both set out to criticize the response of the other. The White House seems content with the major role it played in negotiating the fragile ceasefire that continues to hold (again for now) at the time of writing, and portrays Chinese diplomacy as nothing more than a bunch of hot air. Meanwhile, the Chinese press continues to attribute blame for the conflict to U.S. policy and point out the ways in which the U.S. position appears weaker as a result. But while President Joe Biden turns up the heat on scrutinizing Chinese investments in the region and tries to keep the Chinese out, Beijing continues to deepen its commitments in the Gulf, with new developments in Iraq and Iran.
America Comfortable with Leadership in the Region
Following the successful brokering of a temporary ceasefire to deliver humanitarian aid and exchange hostages for prisoners, the United States wasted no time congratulating itself for its success, drawing an implicit contrast with China’s approach, which made a lot of noise, yet yielded little results. Despite repeated comments by President Xi Jinping and China’s top diplomatic officials, a diplomatic blitz that saw Zhai Jun criss-cross the region, a delegation of Muslim and Arab leaders in Beijing, and an impromptu online BRICS session, no real results were seen. China had next to no role in the ceasefire negotiations, except perhaps implicitly pressuring the United States by drawing a contrasting response to their support of Israel.
Responding in part to reports that U.S. influence in the region was on the wane, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on 22 November, “We’re comfortable with our relationships. We’re comfortable with American leadership in the region. We’re comfortable that we have the ability to work through partners in the region to achieve outcomes and results that are beneficial to all of us.” Kirby emphasized that Biden had been “personally involved” in the negotiations. Speaking to VOA, Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, said that while there was some “element of conflict resolution” to China’s behavior, it was now unlikely to happen under Chinese influence. “I think the Chinese priority is basically to use this opportunity to consolidate and strengthen relationships.”
China Comfortable with American Leadership Backfiring
A special report by Xinhua was highly critical of the United States for supporting Israel’s invasion of Gaza and the expansion of settlements over the last few decades, which the authors charge led to the present situation. The report claimed U.S. support for Israel has backfired and seriously damaged the U.S. position vis-à-vis its Arab allies. Moreover, the Biden administration faces serious political pressure at home due to the rising opposition of younger Democrat voters to Israel’s bombardment of Gaza and U.S. support. They also charge it will also raise pressure on U.S. military positions in the region, hampering the U.S. attempt to “pivot East.” Thus, in Xinhua’s assessment, Biden’s vision for the Middle East “comes to nothing.” Another article observed the “spillover effects,” including increased competition for military and financial resources to support Ukraine, and “social instability” in the EU driven by popular anger at the level of support some governments, like Germany and the UK, have shown for Israel.
The coverage of the ceasefire in Chinese media has been supportive but cautious, with live coverage of both the released hostages and the continued violence on the ground. An article from the day after the truce proclaimed that China’s “stance and action” on the issue were “widely recognized,” and chronicled various supportive efforts, including about $2 million (15 million yuan) worth of aid through Egyptian channels. Ignoring the fact that negotiations for a ceasefire were proceeding without them, it focused on how the joint delegation of Arab and Muslim leaders “chose China as the first stop for international mediation,” demonstrating their trust in Beijing.
The BRI Marches On
Despite this tit for tat, China does not appear to be letting up on its efforts to deepen diplomatic and economic ties in the region. Wang Wenbin, the spokesman of China’s ministry of foreign affairs, announced on 27 November that China, as the rotating chair of the United Nations Security Council this month, was planning to hold a high-level meeting of the Security Council on the Palestinian-Israeli issue on 29 November, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi set to travel to New York to chair the meeting.
More substantially, the Iraq-China Chamber of Commerce was officially established on 26 November. Iraqi Trade Minister Asir Ghurair said that the establishment of the Iraq-China Chamber of Commerce would help strengthen economic and trade relations between the two countries, and that “the future business prospects between Iraq and China are bright.” Iraq is consistently one of the largest recipients of China’s BRI investment funds, with over $30 billion of combined public and private investment in total, so the prospects of greater economic investment are significant.
In neighboring Iran, it was announced that China has committed $2.2 billion to invest in expanding Tehran’s Imam Khomeini airport, although as is often the case in Iran, details were scarce. An unnamed Chinese company is allegedly going to inject investment during the “second phase” after an initial first phase of construction with a budget of $500 million under the auspices of the IRGC. Deals between Iran and China have fallen apart before under similar circumstances, like the Yadavaran oil fields, which also allegedly has a planned phase 2 funded by Sinopec that hasn’t materialized for almost 20 years now.
No Surprise—China Keeps its Eye on the Economic Ball
Whatever happens in the region, it seems that China’s efforts to build economic links to the Gulf continues unimpeded. This has not gone unnoticed by the United States, which continues to raise the pressure on China and increase efforts to keep it out of the region. Bloomberg reported on 25 November that the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States was reviewing several Middle East sovereign wealth funds for their ties to China, claiming that these might pose national security risks. But while the United States was able to successfully pressure Israel into reducing some of its ties to China, it will probably be trickier to do so with the Gulf nations, which don’t enjoy the same degree of support from the United States.
