Following discussions and a media appearance with his Saudi counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week culminated in a meeting with the Kingdom’s de facto ruler, the one and only Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). It was the first meeting between MBS and a senior Iranian official, and the first trip by a senior Iranian official to Saudi Arabia since the March 2023 rapprochement between the two nations.
In the wake of the visit, a certain giddiness could be detected in the tone of the Iranian punditry. It was as though they were finally freed from the mind-numbing rhetoric of revolutionary resistance to see and discuss new and exciting geopolitical possibilities grounded in tangible movement on the ground. Dismiss it as irrational exuberance, but the commentary surrounding the visit was qualitatively different. It seemed to suggest a profound reimagining of the regional, if not international, order. To be more precise, it suggested a reimagining of Iran’s place in that order. The Iranian media, which possesses remarkable leeway to debate issues, and often serves as a reflection of official thinking, lost no time in constructing narratives that might buttress the Nezam’s decision to stick with the Saudi deal.
There were, to be sure, the obligatory swipes at Israel, as when the conservative outlet Rahbord-e Mo’aser identified the primary advantage of strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia as “the neutralization of U.S. and Israeli plots for the region.”
But the predominant tone was decidedly more visionary. Hardline analyst Hadi Seyyedafqahi envisioned prospects for collaborative security patrols, joint military exercises, and enhanced security cooperation. Reza Sadrolhoseini, a conservative observer, contended that the deepening of ties between Tehran and Riyadh held potential for a gamut of benefits from catalyzing the formation of energy consortia, fortifying the resilience of the Palestinian resistance, empowering the broader Muslim world, and creating opportunities for establishing relations with other Muslim nations. Hardline outlets enthusiastically shared images of a meeting between Iranian and Saudi military officials on the sidelines of Russia’s Army-2023 International Military-Technical Forum and Exhibition. [See PersuMedia’s Daily Summary article “Hopes, Concerns for Relations with Riyadh” 17 August 2023.]
The only potential sticking point in the evolution of Iranian-Saudi ties noted was the issue of the Al-Durra/Arash gas field, to which Saudi Arabia and Kuwait claim exclusive rights. And even here, conservative analysts such as Mohammad-Sadeq Mehrju cautioned against irresponsible statements and actions on the issue that might jeopardize the course of productive Iranian-Saudi relations. In fact, as noted in our lead article for the week, “Tehran-Riyadh Relations: Revolutionary or Progressive Approach?,” the importance of this story is that while no one was willing to ignore or concede rights to the gas fields, there did not seem to be any desire from any political camp to draw deal-breaking red lines around the issue. Such reasonableness would have been unheard of a year ago.
Rather, judging from both the statements of pundits and officials, the emphasis was more on building upon the original intention of the deal, which was to enhance regional stability and security. As for the issue of the gas fields, the dominant tone was set by former diplomat Mohammad-Hosein Mala’ek who argued that if Iran’s approach remained reasonable and cooperative, and mindful of its national interests, the issue could be resolved. Other conservative outlets remained optimistic, suggesting that the good offices of players like China, Qatar, and Oman could assist in resolution of the dispute. In fact, when asked whether China would mediate among the three parties involved in the joint gas field, the Chinese ambassador to Kuwait responded: “If there is a friendly desire for stability, a suitable path can undoubtedly be found.” [See “Hopes, Concerns for Relations with Riyadh,” PersuMedia Daily Summary, 17 August 2023.]
Interestingly, the sourest notes were from the reformist-leaning camp. Reformist politician Heshamtollah Falahtpisheh voiced his disappointment over the lack of tangible economic gains resulting from the renewed ties with Riyadh or membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Analyst Rahman Qahramanpur argued that the greatest obstacle to future Iran-Saudi relations was not the gas field dispute, but the fact that regional politics was not a bilateral game between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but rather a multilateral competitive one involving growing Arab ties with Israel, Turkey’s expanding economic relations in the region, not to mention China’s interests and equities that might cramp Iran’s room for maneuver.
Indeed, everywhere Iran turns, it is caught up in a cat’s cradle of competing and conflicting interests of regional and international states.
As we note in “‘Look to East’ Places Iran amidst Eastern Power Rivalry,” Iran’s plans to develop the port at Chabahar are inevitably complicated by China’s relations with Pakistan and the development of the port of Gwadar. Media outlets from Khabar Online, an outlet close to the moderate conservative Ali Larijani to reformist Iran Diplomacy, viewed China’s intentions with suspicion, judging China’s interest a much more closely aligned with Pakistan and the future economic potential of and access to Gwadar. And as for India, Abolfazl Zohrevand, an international affairs analyst with a hardline stance, suggested that India’s role in developing Chabahar would be limited by US pressure and the problematic role of Pakistan, which has proposed linking the two ports.
But overall, the prevailing tone was optimistic, even visionary, with talk of redefinitions of security in the region. This raises the obvious questions: After all these years, why? And why now?
When an unexpected diplomatic rapprochement occurs as happened in the March 2023 agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the natural tendency was, and still is, to ask: Is it real? Will it last? The answer is, at the risk of sounding simplistic: it will last as long as it is convenient. It will last, in the eyes of Iranian and Saudi stakeholders, until it begins to hurt more than benefit their respective interests. We should be under no illusion that there has occurred some profound shift in the dynamics of inter-state competition and rivalry.
In PersuMedia’s Analytic Brief “Look East” or “Look to Each Other”?: China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Iran-Saudi Normalization [10 May 2023], we hypothesized that the shift in policy was a result of a “hurting stalemate,” in which both Tehran and Riyadh saw no way forward but along a path of cooperation. Simply put, both sides were feeling the economic and geopolitical consequences of their prolonged conflict, leading both parties to conclude that the status quo was unsustainable and unacceptable. Iran’s motivations for lowering tensions were fairly obvious even to a casual observer—an ongoing economic crisis, crippling U.S. sanctions, political unrest, and diplomatic isolation. And although Iran’s regional ambitions always have been hamstrung by geographic, economic, and political factors, now the military dimension is more important than ever. Precision guided weapons and drone warfare make asymmetrical capabilities the new normal, not to mention traditional balancing behavior where states “gang up” on the aggressor. So, what’s a self-respecting revolutionary power to do these days?
In Robert Gilpin’s War & Change in World Politics [1981], he argued that “an international system is stable [i.e., in a state of equilibrium] if no state believes it possible to change the system.” Moreover, “a state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.”
But there could be more here than mere cost/benefit calculations.
Indeed, things get really interesting when Gilpin quotes Henry Kissinger from A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957): “[W]hile powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of a historical existence. No power will submit to a settlement, however well balanced and however ‘secure,’ which seems totally to deny its vision of itself.”
A surprisingly social constructivist sentiment from an arch-realist.
Is this what we see happening in Iran? Are Iran’s pundits and political elites finally reimagining Iran’s identity as compatible with working within the system as opposed to being rigidly and ideologically opposed to it? Is their reimagining a reflection of official policy? In a speech to Iranian diplomats in May, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei insisted that Iran would not compromise its principles, but then went on to emphasize expediency, flexibility, and—dare we say it?—pragmatism in foreign policy. It is clearly obvious to any informed observer that Iran has nowhere to turn, no avenue in pursuit of revolutionary resistance and systemic change that doesn’t lead to greater economic hardship, isolation, and national embarrassment. Yes, there is still the possibility of inconveniencing shipping in the Gulf, or feckless funding of a militia here or there. But none of that will amount to achieving an archaic and, in many ways, medieval revolutionary vision. We can only hope that the Iranian leadership and its elites are finally seeing it the same way.
