If we compare last week’s Opinion AI analysis by PersuMedia’s AI firm Quantum Politics with this week’s, we see a drastic drop recorded in the level of pessimism toward Stability (-18%), Legitimacy (-35%), and Economic Policy (-34%).
What gives?
Certainly, the underlying issues that were driving the rise in pessimism prior to the sudden reversal did not go away—economic hardship, potential for continued popular unrest, trouble brewing in the Caucasus, pesky Afghans with minds of their own, not to mention domestic fingers pointing at the velayet-e faqih itself as the root cause of current predicaments.
To put the numbers in perspective, we note first that pessimism toward Economic Policies and Stability returned to previous levels after a brief spike. Legitimacy was the real winner, but that number has always been tolerable, with the recent decrease possibly an overreaction to the overall upbeat attitudes regarding recent events. But overall, the mood in the media appeared to be bravely ambivalent.
We also note that the recent dramatic decrease in pessimism in the recent Opinion AI chart was arguably in response to some very specific developments over the past week—the hostage release and access to the $6 billion, improving relations with Azerbaijan, and positive signs for the progress on JCPoA negotiations, all given a boost by the celebration of Sacred Defense Week. There was even measured reaction to the prospects of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement.
Azerbaijan-Armenia
Even in the midst of the unfolding refugee crisis, concerns over Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and the very real possibility of the establishment of the Zangezur corridor cutting off Tehran’s direct access to Yerevan were mitigated somewhat as Iranian Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian met his Azeri counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on Saturday in which they talked of improved relations, as reported by Tasnim. Rahbord-e Moaser, an outlet affiliated with the IRGC, framed Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s recent visit to Tehran in a positive light and adopted a more measured stance regarding the Zangezur corridor, provided the corridor was opened while protecting Iran’s national interests. One proposal that would presumably satisfy that requirement was for the deployment of Iranian peacekeeping forces to the Syunik province of Armenia, a region that the Zangezur corridor passes through. Another voice calling for de-escalation of tensions was that of former Iranian ambassador to Armenia Ali Saqqa’ian, who underscored the paramount importance of regional peace and playing a collaborative role with Moscow and Ankara. And apart from Shoigu’s visit, Moscow has for some time been on record as opposing Yerevan’s access to the International Criminal Court that has an arrest warrant out for Putin. Word is that Putin has decided to let Armenia twist, and Iran wasn’t deaf to the message—playing mediator and peace broker no longer appeared a viable path.
JCPoA
Another potential boost to morale this week was a more positive outlook for the JCPoA. Following the prisoner exchange between Iran and the United States, a shift occurred in the stance of Iran’s hardliners regarding the revival of the JCPoA and FATF agreements. During meetings at the UN General Assembly in New York, Iranian officials, including President Ebrahim Ra’isi, expressed optimism about the prospects of revitalizing the JCPoA. International relations commentator Abdolrahman Fathollahi noted that the presence of chief nuclear negotiator Ali Baqeri-Kani with President Ra’isi and Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian at the UN General Assembly all pointed to movement on the issue. Of course, Iran’s hardliners are interpreting any progress in these negotiations as validation of the effectiveness of Iran’s hard power. For example, Nour News, an outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, was upbeat, crediting the recent deal between Tehran and Washington and improved JCPoA prospects with Iran’s growing influence that has compelled Western powers to engage more constructively with Iran, departing from confrontational approaches. To be sure, some, such as reformist former MP Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, tried to sidestep the issue and divert attention to the Ra’isi administration’s overall inept governance in general and handling of relations with the U.S. in particular, but opinion overall appeared upbeat.
Saudi Arabia-Israel
Regarding the very serious implications for Iran of the impending normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iranian opinion was not hopeless or desperate, but less optimistically guarded. Despite the significant obstacles to a speedy Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, many Iranian pundits appeared to view the prospect a foregone conclusion and thus already factored it into any geopolitical calculus. However, some commentators chose to play up U.S.-Israeli tensions as manifest in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, rather than formally at the White House. Conservative journalist Puya Jadi reported on the suspension of negotiations between Saudi and Israeli officials, which Israel denied. However, Saudi sources cited several primary reasons for this pause, including the Israeli government’s refusal to grant autonomy to Palestinian self-governing bodies and its abandonment of the two-state solution. The conservative outlet Nasim Online also highlighted the Palestinian question and speculated about Saudi Arabia’s preparedness to withdraw from talks unless concessions are made. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim suggested that while Saudi Arabia might be ideally inclined towards normalizing relations with the Israeli government, Riyadh will likely drag its feet absent substantial guarantees from both Washington and Tel Aviv on security issues and the Palestinian portfolio.
Some commentators attempted to keep a happy face regarding Iran’s own relations with Saudi Arabia. Energy markets commentator Mahmud Khaqani delved into the realm of possibilities regarding collaboration between Iran and Saudi Arabia within the petrochemical sector. At the same time, real fears persisted. Eco highlighted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s support for normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Sharq reported on the meeting between Netanyahu and Erdoğan at UNGA. Eqtesad News reported Saudi Arabia seeks extensive assistance in developing a non-military nuclear program, which includes uranium enrichment on Saudi soil among other crucial benefits. Overall, the fear is that Saudi-Israeli rapprochement could set the stage for a domino effect among other Arab and Muslim nations, effectively marking the end of Israel’s isolation—a solitude that has persisted since its establishment in 1948.
Meanwhile…
Concern mounted over the UAE’s renewed demands for the return of three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf, known as the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa. And it doesn’t help that the U.S. supports the UAE, while Russia and China have thus far declined to support Iran’s claims outright. In response, the IRGC’s call for a task force and a comprehensive effort by the government to establish Iran’s ownership underscore the seriousness of the matter. Moreover, UNGA was a platform for Kuwait to assert its ownership of natural resources in the Arash/al-Durra gas field.
In a more upbeat geostrategic narrative, the former Iranian economic advisor in China, Mansur Salehfard, depicted Iran’s allies Russia and China as on the move, highlighting Russian President Putin’s impending visit to China, expected to focus on energizing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and renewal of China’s commitment to establishing efficient trade routes through Iran. And Rahbord-e Moaser diverted attention to the impending activation of the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus land corridor. That, however, along with China’s Belt & Road Initiative, can expect to face headwinds from the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced on 9 September at the G-20 summit in New Delhi.
The Best Defense
At the end of the day, faced with shrinking regional room to maneuver as the Middle East, true to historical form, becomes more penetrated by international players and increasingly independent and emboldened regional ones, Iran can be expected to resort to a “spoiler” strategy. Iranian media outlets are explicit in this. According to analyses from hardline media and statements by senior military figures in Iran, it appears that Iran is committed to strengthening and utilizing the “axis of resistance”—Tehran’s backing of Shiite proxy groups—in the region to disrupt the interests of the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East. The hardline Mashreq media outlet highlighted the effective strategy of the axis in countering Western interests in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. Mohammadreza Hasani-Ahangar, head of the IRGC-affiliated Imam Hosein University, described Iran’s multifaceted approach as the simultaneous use of “defensive and offensive realism.”
Back to the future!
