Iranian observers have been looking a little enviously at Saudi Arabia’s recently concluded summit in Jeddah that brought together representatives from more than forty countries and international organizations to discuss the Ukraine war and Kyiv’s ten-point plan for peace. The meeting was not a conclave of bit players: although Russia was not invited, China, the United States, the EU, India, Brazil, and South Africa were among those in attendance. Although some principlist media in Iran have tended to pooh-pooh the importance of the event, noting that the summit produced no final statement and extensively quoting Russian officials’ invective against the summit, other observers pointed to Riyadh’s ability to work with both Eastern and Western powers and rebuild its international credibility. Unstated but implicit in the commentary was the recognition that Iran almost certainly could not pull off a similar diplomatic extravaganza.
Iranian envy was coupled with a concern that Saudi Arabia’s growing prominence might eclipse that of Iran. As reported in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, a former diplomat writing for the reformist-leaning Iran Diplomacy website assessed that Saudi Arabia was positioning itself as the world’s “gateway” to the Arab World, which would negatively impact Iran’s own efforts in the region. Others fretted that Riyadh’s policy included normalization of ties with Israel, especially as recent remarks by Israeli officials indicated their acceptance of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program. Iranian observers remain a bit puzzled by what they see as a shift in the Israeli position over the Saudi nuclear program, wondering if it has broader implications, but they have clearly spotted how much more restrained have been the Israeli and US reactions to Saudi nuclear aspirations as compared to their intense efforts to prevent Iran from advancing its own nuclear capabilities.
These latest Saudi diplomatic achievements no doubt sting a little extra because they follow previous successes in recent months that embarrassed Iran. Although the Iranian government has touted its “Look East” policy as a signature foreign policy achievement and has unfailingly aligned itself with its Eastern patrons Russia and China, Saudi Arabia and the GCC obtained Chinese and Russian endorsement of joint statements that implicitly questioned Iran’s sovereignty over the disputed Persian Gulf islands Iran has occupied since 1971. Meanwhile, the ostensible economic benefits of looking east—the benefits of most importance to Iran’s unhappy and increasingly impoverished population—have been underwhelming. Russia is investing in some rail links of interest to it and Iran in circumventing sanctions, and it is buying Iranian UAVs to use against Ukraine as fast as Iran can make them, while Chinese companies continue to buy Iranian oil at a discount. But, as we have noted a number of times in this space, Russian and especially Chinese trade and investment with Iran is dwarfed by the volume of business these countries are doing with Saudi Arabia and the GCC.
What makes this outcome especially bitter for Tehran is that the “Look East” policy was sold as “neutralizing” US sanctions. President Ebrahim Ra’isi and his carefully curated conservative government would deliver the prosperity his discredited predecessor Hasan Rouhani had promised, but without going hat in hand to the West. Instead, as reported in our China article in this week’s newsletter, the head of Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Exporters Union told reporters this week that Russian and Chinese companies are largely avoiding doing business with Iran due to sanctions. He noted as well that Iran’s ability to exploit its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is hobbled not only by Western sanctions, but by Iran’s noncompliance with the multilateral FATF agreement on money laundering. As reported this week in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, the reluctance of Chinese companies to do business with Iran, and such actions as SINOPECs withdrawal from the project to develop the Yadavaran oil field, are interpreted by some Iranian observers as subtle Chinese pressure on Iran to join FATF. They may be right; a recent article by Chinese researchers published by Xinhua tended to fault Iran for the stagnation in Iran-Chinese economic relations.
No doubt hardliners in Tehran are as puzzled by Riyadh’s enlarged prominence as the Grinch was by the Whos’ ability to celebrate Christmas even after he had stolen all their presents. After all, it was the success of Iranian hard power wielded by the Qods Force in Syria, Iraq, and especially Yemen that, from the Iranian point of view, forced the Saudis to abandon their efforts to role back Iranian influence in those theaters and seek détente. From the hardliners’ perspective, it is the Islamic Republic, by virtue of its network of client militias and its burgeoning inventory of ballistic missiles and drones, which stands astride the region like a colossus. So how is it that Iran has become the Rodney Dangerfield of the Persian Gulf?
Perhaps the answer is—as it often is—Tehran’s rigid prioritization of security interests and hard power over flexibility and economic development. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif famously confided in remarks that were later leaked to the media that Iran had paid “many diplomatic costs because the “field” [the military establishment and policies] was a priority.” According to a recent article in Iran Diplomacy, Iran’s security-focused and unilateralist strategy has tended be perceived by other countries in the region as a threat to their aspirations for a developed and modernized Middle East. This policy has left Iran isolated.
At least as important, however, may be Riyadh’s willingness to recognize the failure of its initial policies—in Yemen and Syria, etc.—and the flexibility to cut its losses and adopt a different course of action to achieve its goals. No one is going to hold the Saudi Crown Prince up as a paragon of enlightened leadership, but he has been smart enough to know when his policy wasn’t working and to try another tack. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, on the other hand, views steadfast resistance as the prime virtue of a statesman and adversity in achieving success is just a test of one’s faith and resolve. It has worked for him, but not for the Iranian people.
Interestingly, though, it is not just reformist observers who have recognized the implications of the regime’s rigid security-oriented policies. Some of the more thoughtful principlist publications also have begun to identify the shortcomings of the Nezam’s rigidity and failure to effectively promote economic development. Khabar Online, a principlist publication close to former Majles Speaker Ali Larijani, has highlighted how Iranian hardline circles in Qom and Mashhad have undermined negotiations that might resolve Iran’s disputes with the West and alleviate sanctions. Khamenei may find it virtuous to resist to the bitter end, like the Imam Hosein, but there seems to be growing unwillingness among some elites, at least, to avoid national martyrdom.
