In Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johson, there is a famous anecdote in which Boswell remarked to Johnson that he had just attended a Quaker meeting, where he was surprised to hear a woman preach. Johnson retorted, “Sir, a woman’s preaching is like a dog’s walking on his hind legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all.” (Men could get away with such quips in the 1700s.) Well, I am not foolish enough to plunge into a discussion of the pros and cons of women preachers, but I am just crazy enough to raise once again the topic of Iran’s restraint and diplomatic pragmatism in the ongoing war in Gaza. Like a bipedal canine, Iran’s restraint is surprising—but perhaps it shouldn’t be.
We have detailed previously Iran’s reluctance—shared by Hizballah—to open a second front from Lebanon against Israel, despite senior Hamas figure Khaled Meshaal’s public complaint that Hamas expected more support from that quarter. The factors we noted then—Iran’s apparent lack of foreknowledge of the Hamas attack, its need to preserve Hizballah as a deterrent, and its lack of preparation for and vulnerability in a direct clash with Israel and the US—remain as significant now as they were in October. Iran has good reasons to be careful.
It may seem odd to talk of Iranian restraint when the Iraqi militias it backs have claimed 92 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since October and just this week rocketed the US Embassy compound in Baghdad. Iran’s allies in Yemen, the Houthis, have similarly launched missiles and drones at Israel and at US Navy and commercial shipping in the Red Sea, while Hizballah fighters have regularly skirmished with Israeli troops along Lebanon’s border with Israel. As deadly as such harassment is, it is far short of what Iran and its allies are capable of. Moreover, if Tehran is to retain its influence and leadership over its Arab clients, it has to make some show of support for Hamas or lose all credibility. And, as reported in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, President Ebrahim Ra’isi’s administration is taking heat from its hardline supporters over its perceived passivity. The US Government faces a similar dilemma in supporting Israel’s right to self-defense while at the same time criticizing Israeli excesses in its campaign to destroy Hamas. The difficulty great powers have experienced in trying to restrain their allies is an old story, stretching at least as far back as the 5th Century BC, when the Corinthians berated their stronger Spartan allies for their caution and chivvied them into declaring war on Athens.
But as wobbly and dubious as Iran’s efforts are in trying to balance its interest in avoiding escalation against its need to retain leadership of its restive Axis of Resistance—not unlike the halting efforts of a dog walking on its hind legs—it has so far not cried havoc and let slip the dogs of war, despite mounting Palestinian casualties and the potential crippling of Hamas’ military capabilities. No doubt US resolve—manifested in the movement of aircraft carriers and other forces into the Middle East theater—has served as a strong argument for Iranian restraint. But also encouraging restraint likely has been the messages Iran and the US have exchanged during the conflict. The ability to communicate and make clear one’s interests and red lines, privately, is invaluable in managing the crisis. The quiet diplomacy the US conducted with Iran earlier this year, aimed at reaching an informal agreement to reduce tensions and to exchange prisoners was upended by Hamas’ terrorist offensive, but those earlier talks may have made it easier for the US and Iran to make their intentions clear to each other during the crisis.
In a similar fashion, Iran’s gradually warming relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC is almost certainly an additional source of restraint on Iran. After years of tension and broken diplomatic ties, the détente between Iran and the Saudis brokered last March by the Chinese has eased pressure on Iran and opened up the potential for increased bilateral trade and badly needed Arab investment in Iran. If the conventional wisdom that all the leaders of the Islamic Republic respond to is pressure, the easing of tensions with Riyadh should have emboldened Iran. It hasn’t, even though hardliners in Tehran have agitated for a declaration of war and threatened to impeach Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian. Instead, we have seen the Islamic Republic twice sign on to declarations endorsing, with reservations, a two-state solution to the Palestine conflict. Iran is not interested in being isolated again, outside the Arab-Islamic consensus. Tehran may be frustrated by its Arab and Muslim partners’ disinterest in oil boycotts and breaking relations with Israel, but Iranian leaders know they have a much greater chance of gaining a hearing, and perhaps changing minds, if they stay inside the tent instead of sniping at the Arabs from outside.
And don’t discount the lure of economic incentives. The Islamic Republic is just a year removed from some of the most sustained and difficult protests since the revolution. Its leaders are so jumpy about provoking renewed civil unrest that they cannot agree on a new hejab law and, out of fear that it might spawn another social movement, they have censured a 70-year-old taxi driver in Rasht for posting videos of himself dancing and singing with friends. So, it is a fair bet that Tehran is not interested in sacrificing the prospect of sanctions relief or increased foreign investment for a risky escalation in Gaza. Consistent with such a position are reports that the Saudis offered to increase cooperation with Iran and invest in its economy if Iran in return reined in its client militias. As Amwaj Media has pointed out, the Saudi offer was probably not so crassly direct as reported in the media, but the Saudis have no doubt made clear to Iran that détente and de-escalation will remain limited at best without a resolution to some of the outstanding disputes, foremost being the one over Iran’s nuclear program. Interestingly, at about the same time as these reports at the end of November, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told an audience of Basijis that Iran does not seek the destruction of Israel or aim to “throw Zionists into the sea,” a message that, as reported in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, was reinforced by the government’s news agency IRNA. This did not represent a significant shift in policy so much as a shift in emphasis and rhetoric, but nonetheless it is suggestive of Tehran’s interest in accommodating Saudi concerns and softening its international image. It may be worthwhile to explore how deep and serious that Iranian interest is.
Little movement will be possible while the war in Gaza grinds on. But when the guns fall silent there may be opportunities to ease tensions in the region, including with Iran. A policy of only brandishing sticks at Iran will fail, but one that also offers incentives may prove more fruitful. The “Iran only understands force” school will resist such diplomacy, as likely will Israel, but a timid reluctance to engage Iran will ensure more of the same—which hasn’t been too pleasant these last two months or so. If Ronald Reagan could sit down with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev while Soviet troops were trying to crush US-supported Afghan insurgents, surely the United States could explore resolving outstanding disputes with Tehran even as Iran funnels support to its client militias. If such diplomacy fails, the US will not be much worse off, if at all, than it is now; but if it succeeds, we may begin to move toward a less turbulent Middle East. Who knows? In such a situation, the dog may even get to like walking on its hind legs.
