The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime marks a historic turning point in the Syrian conflict, with wide-ranging implications for the region. The Islamist-led rebel coalition, spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has emerged as the dominant force in the post-Assad landscape, leaving Iran to grapple with a drastically altered geopolitical reality. However, it would be premature to interpret these events as heralding a permanent defeat for Tehran or to overlook its potential to play the role of a “spoiler” should the new Syrian leadership and its allies seek to rebuild at Iran’s expense. Despite losing a key ally, Iran remains an influential regional player with robust domestic defense capabilities, cohesive military and security forces, and no organized internal opposition capable of mounting a credible challenge to its regime. The fallout from Assad’s defeat appears limited to internal blame-shifting and finger-pointing within Tehran’s leadership. Moreover, Iran benefits from a regional environment increasingly shaped by pragmatism, as major Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE focus on economic modernization and stability rather than prolonged conflict. These factors enable Iran to recalibrate its strategy in Syria, ensuring that its influence remains significant within the geopolitical landscape, however meddlesome or destructive.
A History of Adversity
Iran’s alliance with the Assad regime was a cornerstone of its regional strategy, forming part of its “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and Western powers. Tehran provided Assad with substantial financial aid, military support, and proxy forces to suppress the Syrian uprising, positioning itself as a vital ally of Damascus. For over a decade, this partnership allowed Iran to expand its influence and maintain supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In contrast, HTS and its predecessors, rooted in Sunni Islamist ideology, emerged as staunch adversaries of both Assad and Iran. The group framed Tehran as an occupier and a primary antagonist of the Syrian revolution, deepening the sectarian divide. Over the years, HTS’s rhetoric and actions targeted Iran-backed militias in Syria, solidifying its position as a fierce opponent of Iranian influence.
The New Landscape in Syria
The swift fall of Assad’s government has disrupted Iran’s carefully constructed regional strategy. With Damascus now under the control of HTS and its allies, Tehran faces the loss of a critical ally and a key conduit for projecting power in the Levant. This collapse also threatens Iran’s strategic depth, particularly its ability to support Hezbollah and counterbalance Israeli influence.
HTS’s victory, while monumental, presents its own challenges. Governing a nation fractured by war will require balancing its hardline base with the pragmatic demands of state-building. The group’s attempts to rebrand itself as a moderate Islamist entity signal a potential shift in focus, but its ideological hostility toward Iran remains a barrier to cooperation.
Tehran’s Pragmatic Response
In response to these seismic shifts, Iran has reportedly initiated contact with factions within Syria’s new leadership. According to reports, Iranian officials aim to secure limited cooperation to protect Shia communities in Syria and maintain residual influence in the region. This reflects Tehran’s broader willingness to cooperate across ideological divides, as demonstrated by its support for Hamas and Palestinian causes despite sectarian differences. However, HTS’s historical resistance to Iranian presence and its largely local agenda make meaningful collaboration unlikely. HTS will likely avoid tolerating an overt Iranian presence, which could provoke Israeli reprisals.
This pragmatic approach mirrors Iran’s broader foreign policy strategy, which often balances ideological commitments with realpolitik. Faced with the collapse of a key ally, Tehran appears willing to explore avenues for coexistence to safeguard its interests, even if meaningful collaboration with HTS remains unlikely.
Challenges for HTS
For HTS, the challenges of governance in post-Assad Syria are immense. The group must manage internal rivalries, rebuild war-torn infrastructure, and establish a functioning administration. Additionally, its hardline Islamist base may resist any overtures or compromises with former adversaries, including Iran.
Economically, Syria’s devastated economy requires substantial international aid, but HTS’s ties to extremist elements could complicate its access to funding. These governance challenges could constrain HTS’s ability to actively oppose Iran in the immediate term, even as ideological hostilities persist.
Regional Actors and Broader Dynamics
The fall of Assad also alters the balance of power in the region, with key players like Turkey, Israel, and the Persian Gulf states recalibrating their strategies. Turkey, in particular, has emerged as a critical player in shaping Syria’s new reality. This is the second conflict in Iran’s “near abroad” in which Turkey has enabled groups unsympathetic to Iran to prevail over its traditional clients and allies. For example, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan during its capture of Nagorno-Karabakh a year ago marked a decisive blow to Armenian forces, a traditional partner of Iran.
Turkey’s involvement in Syria follows a similar pattern. By supporting certain rebel factions and asserting its influence in northern Syria, Ankara has not only strengthened its hand in regional affairs but also limited Tehran’s capacity to shape outcomes. Turkey’s backing of Sunni factions has directly countered Iran’s Shia-aligned strategy, further complicating Tehran’s objectives in Syria. Turkey’s actions could exacerbate Iran-Turkey tensions, particularly if Ankara’s ambitions in Syria begin to clash with Tehran’s efforts to regain influence in the region. Both Iran and Turkey will need to manage their altered degrees of power and influence carefully to avoid rising tensions between them. Additionally, Turkey’s bolstered regional role may strain its relationships with other key players, such as Russia and the Persian Gulf states, potentially creating opportunities for Iran to exploit emerging fissures to its advantage.
The Persian Gulf states, traditionally opposed to Iranian influence, may also see an opportunity to balance peaceful coexistence with Iran while putting Tehran on notice that future hegemonic influence in Syria is unwelcome.
Israel, meanwhile, has seized the opportunity presented by Assad’s fall to fortify its position in the Golan Heights. As of mid-November, Israel was building new defenses in the Golan, which at least some observers argued violated the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Recently, Israel moved—ostensibly “temporarily”—to occupy a buffer zone on Syrian territory beyond the Golan. Israel’s actions to exploit Assad’s fall to strengthen and expand its position in the Golan could lead to friction with the new regime in Damascus and further Israeli military action to counter perceived threats. These developments highlight that Israel’s actions are not purely defensive but reflect broader strategic ambitions to consolidate its influence in the region. Additionally, HTS may face pressure to address Israel’s policies, especially if anti-Zionist sentiment grows. While it is not in HTS’s immediate interest to provoke Israel, the group may find it politically expedient to play the anti-Zionist card to deflect criticism of its rule. However, whether such rhetoric would translate into substantive actions remains uncertain, as HTS must weigh the risks of direct confrontation with a currently triumphant Israel.
The Russian Factor
Russia’s long-standing relationship with Assad and its role as a key player in the Syrian conflict further complicates Iran’s relationship with the new leadership in Syria. Moscow’s military intervention was critical in propping up Assad during the war, and its interests in Syria often aligned with Tehran’s. However, with Assad now ousted, Russia’s next moves could influence Iran’s approach to the new power structure. If Russia seeks to cultivate ties with HTS or other factions to maintain its foothold in Syria, it could limit Iran’s ability to assert its influence independently. Alternatively, if Moscow distances itself from the new leadership, Tehran might find itself more isolated in engaging with the emerging authorities.
Adding to this complexity is the perception in Tehran that Russia’s failure to come decisively to Assad’s defense—beyond some token airstrikes—raises questions about the reliability of Moscow as a partner in times of crisis. This skepticism could prompt Iran to not only reevaluate its broader strategic alignments but also adjust its immediate tactical decisions in Syria. Iran may increase its engagement with local militias, work to establish independent logistical hubs, and leverage its intelligence networks to preemptively counterbalance Russian actions. Additionally, Tehran might seek to fortify its clandestine supply routes to Hezbollah, bypassing traditional reliance on Russian cooperation. These tactical adaptations underscore Iran’s determination to maintain influence despite shifting alliances.
The interplay between Russian and Iranian strategies in post-Assad Syria will shape the geopolitical calculus for both countries as they navigate a fragmented and volatile landscape.
Domestic Implications for Iran
Domestically, the loss of Assad’s regime intensifies scrutiny of Iran’s foreign interventions. Critics within Iran may point to the substantial economic and human costs of its Syrian campaign, arguing that resources spent propping up Assad could have been better directed toward alleviating domestic hardships. This criticism could further embolden calls for Tehran to prioritize internal stability over costly regional engagements.
At the same time, Iran’s leadership must contend with the symbolic blow of losing a key ally, which could embolden opposition voices and weaken the narrative of Iran’s regional supremacy. Criticism of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its perceived “invincibility” may grow as its inability to secure a favorable outcome in Syria becomes a focal point. This growing discontent could undermine the IRGC’s domestic reputation as a cornerstone of regime stability, potentially emboldening factions within Iran to challenge the regime more openly. Additionally, this criticism may force the IRGC to recalibrate its broader military strategy to rebuild its credibility and demonstrate effectiveness in other regional theaters. Similarly, discontent over the Russia connection is likely to increase, with Tehran reportedly already scapegoating Assad as incompetent to obscure its own unwavering support for him.
Meanwhile, Iran’s efforts to rebuild its networks in the region could exploit Syria’s fragmentation. Drawing from its experience in Iraq and Yemen, Tehran may focus on aiding marginalized groups excluded from the new Syrian leadership’s inner circle, fostering graft and crime to re-establish clandestine supply lines to Hezbollah. Observers noting the collapse of the “Axis of Resistance” may underestimate Iran’s ability to adapt. Despite the loss of Assad, Iran could exploit a weakened Syrian state to rebuild or replace its networks. Potential methods include leveraging Iraq’s porous borders to facilitate the movement of arms and personnel, utilizing illicit smuggling routes through Syria to maintain supply chains, and establishing covert alliances with disenfranchised groups within Syria. These strategies echo Iran’s successful resupply of Hezbollah during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, even under significant U.S. presence in Iraq at the time.
The Role of the United States
The United States’ posture following Assad’s fall remains pivotal. Speculation suggests that Washington could interpret Iran’s setbacks as an opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength. Some analysts propose that the U.S. may use this juncture to pursue a “Trumpian” deal with Tehran, leveraging perceptions of Iran’s weakened position to extract concessions while avoiding direct confrontation. Simultaneously, American support for Kurdish-controlled areas in northeast Syria could further complicate Iran’s calculations, especially if HTS intensifies its activities in regions under Kurdish control.
The Road Ahead
The relationship between Iran and Syria’s new rebel leadership is fraught with challenges. Historical animosities, ideological divides, and competing interests create significant obstacles to meaningful engagement. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape may force both sides to explore a tense coexistence, especially if mutual threats, such as the resurgence of ISIS or external interventions, emerge.
For Tehran, the fall of Assad represents a profound setback but also an opportunity to reassess its regional strategy. For HTS, the transition from insurgency to governance will require balancing ideological commitments with practical considerations. As both actors navigate this new chapter, the broader implications for the Middle East—ranging from shifting alliances to heightened tensions—will be profound.
In the end, whether the relationship evolves into fragile coexistence or devolves into renewed conflict, one thing is certain: the collapse of Assad’s regime has irrevocably altered the regional order, forcing all stakeholders to adapt to an uncertain future.
