Strategic Implications for Iraqi Kurdish Leader’s Visit to Tehran:
Reactions to Nechirvan Barzani’s high-profile visit to Iran at the head of a senior delegation from Iraqi Kurdistan underscore the mutual needs of Erbil and Tehran, particularly regarding security, peace, and strategic positioning against other rivals. Ali Khamenei’s reception of Barzani in a room typically reserved for Iranian officials likely signifies a gesture of friendship and warmth from Iran, especially notable after Iran’s January attack on alleged Israeli targets in Erbil. While Tehran remains wary of the presence of Americans, Israelis, and alleged separatist groups, some observers believe that Iran’s retaliatory actions against Israel have caused a shift in the pro-Israeli dynamics of the Kurdistan region. The upcoming elections in Kurdistan could also be a motivating factor for the visit, enabling Barzani to establish a political balance with the Talabani faction and potentially shift the pre-election dynamics in favor of his own party.
Nuclear Deterrence Debate in Iran:
Debates are intensifying in Iran about the deterrent effectiveness of nuclear weapons. While some advocate for nukes, most analysts concur that they do not guarantee absolute deterrence, citing the example of Israel, an unacknowledged nuclear power, which came under attack from Hamas and other adversaries. Although the acquisition of associated knowledge and materials can potentially enhance Iran’s deterrence capability, many argue that possession of a nuclear bomb may create more threats than it eliminates. Opposition from allies like Russia and China, as well as reactions from regional countries, factor into the debates. Observers note that while nuclear deterrence may significantly enhance the Nezam’s survival, the recent crisis in Tel Aviv has shown Iranian authorities that security in the Middle East cannot rely solely on nuclear capabilities. This argument underscores the need for the regime to implement major reforms in social, economic, and other areas to mitigate domestic, regional, and international threats.
Erosion of Geopolitical Advantages:
Concerns are mounting about the erosion of Iran’s geopolitical advantages, highlighted by several developments: the country being bypassed by new trade corridors and oil and gas pipelines, the relative advancement of Persian Gulf countries compared to Iran’s outdated infrastructure, the potential road connection from Turkey to Central Asia through the Zangezur Corridor, and delays in completing key railway projects. Reformist observers attribute this decline to the Iranian government’s failure to recognize the diminishing relevance of geopolitical and ideological factors in favor of increasing geoeconomic considerations. While some may view this declining trend as a rationale for drastic measures like nuclearization, more analysts advocate for a peaceful and pragmatic revision of policies to adapt to developments that affect the geopolitical order regionally and globally.
Succession Purification:
The hardliners’ “purification” project is personal for former president Hasan Rouhani, whose disqualification as a candidate for the Assembly of Experts (AoE) by the Guardian Council denied him a key role in the selection of the next supreme leader. Objecting to this modus operandi, Rouhani told a gathering of his former officials that it was not beneficial to the country and the Nezam to have a “minority” administration, Majles, and AoE. More specifically, he vowed to respond publicly to the Guardian Council’s reasons for his disqualification, which he divulged for the first time: 1) that he had disrespected and insulted the Judiciary and the Guardian Council; and 2) that he had failed to stand up to the West and had implemented the JCPoA badly. Accusing Rouhani of misrepresentation and suggesting he was courting legal jeopardy, the spokesperson of the Guardian Council claimed that disclosure of reasons for candidate disqualification required Majles approval.
Economic Hardship and New Protests:
Far from solving the country’s economic problems, such as runaway inflation and the rate of exchange, the Ra’isi administration’s responses are only leading to greater frustration. Gold traders in the grand bazaars of Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz have gone on strike to protest the administration’s new tax policy, which they consider excessive. It requires them to provide electronic receipts for every transaction and to pay higher taxes, together with other industries like housing and automobiles. Equally disgruntled are truck drivers who object to the government’s reduction of their subsidized gasoline ration, leading to protests that the vice president of the truckers’ union called unplanned, though he seemed supportive. He pointed out that not only were the truck drivers denied better pay, they were in fact hit for higher out-of-pocket fuel costs. The truckers, he pointed out, were not anti-revolutionary thugs; they merely had reasonable demands.
Hijab More Iranian Than Islamic?:
It seems every time Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei adopts a centrist or pragmatic position, extremist elements like Mashhad’s Friday prayer leader Ahmad Alamolhoda, who is a Khamenei appointee, push the envelope farther to the right. During a recent meeting with educators, Khamenei encouraged them to inculcate a sense of national pride in students. Alamolhoda’s advice during his Friday sermon took on a different tone: in his formulation, religion took the top spot, followed closely by national identity. The fact that he acknowledged the latter was so that he would not appear to be in defiance of Khamenei. As for why he de-emphasized Iranianness in favor of Islam, it was to promote one of his favorite themes: the enforcement of hijab observance on Iran’s reluctant women. Perhaps Alamolhoda did take some of Khamenei’s advice to heart. Rather than the Quran, he relied on the strong, independent and definitely non-hijabi female character Manijeh from the Shahnameh to make his point—albeit quite unconvincingly—about the “Iranianness” of hijab.
Privatization Project has Failed:
Such is the conclusion of a recent analytic report in the economic outlet Donya-e-Eqtesad. In a study of the proprietorship and management of the 20 largest companies in Iran’s stock market, it found that 12 are owned and operated by the government or affiliated companies. The data from the privatization project show that after 22 years only 38 percent of its goals have been met. Donya-e-Eqtesad points out that neither the government nor the large semi-private companies in Iran have the political will to promote privatization because of their economic interests. The dominance of the command-rentier economy and corruption are the biggest obstacles to privatization. The outlet argues that Iran’s high corruption ranking, 149 out of 180 countries, is also due to the strong hand of the government in the economy and its unwillingness to liberalize and move toward privatization.
Battle for Majles Leadership:
Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf is actively lobbying MPs in the Twelfth Majles, which will be formally seated on 27 May, for votes as he seeks to retain his speakership. Reports show that, with more than 40 seats still to be decided in a runoff, Qalibaf hosted the elected MPs at the four-star Tehran Grand Hotel for two nights (1–2 May) at government expense and provided them with chauffeur-driven cars as part of their orientation. A serious rival to Qalibaf is the hardline cleric Hamid Rasa’i, who said a few days earlier that the Majles presidium must provide offices, staff, vehicles, and living quarters for lawmakers, which could mean either that he was demanding this from Qalibaf or else that he himself was making promises to win votes. Whatever the case, Rasa’i blasted Qalibaf for currying favor with MPs. He also published an account from a newly elected MP who alleged that Qalibaf’s people were offering such perks, including loans and desired committee appointments.
Islamic Republic’s Risky Class Warfare:
In destroying Iran’s middle class, the ruling establishment in the Islamic Republic is sowing the seeds of confrontation between itself and the lower classes because the middle class typically acts as a buffer between the rulers and the ruled. So says a prominent sociologist, who points out that the middle class, better educated than the masses, plays a moderating and guiding role for the lower classes. However, when it is impoverished and disenfranchised, it can itself become a leading force in protests. The reformist Union of the Nation of Islamic Iran Party has taken note of the plight of the working class as well as educators on International Workers’ Day, not merely for the fact that they are underpaid but also that the state sees them as a security threat. In its statement, the party argues that not until they are treated with respect and allowed to represent themselves will conditions improve. So far, such prescriptions for change have failed to move the Nezam’s decision makers.
Iran-Saudi Economic Relations:
Iranian officials view the participation of the Saudi economic delegation at Iran Expo 2024 as a marker of expanding trade and economic ties, indicating a strong commitment from the Saudi government to align with Iran. However, observers suggest that Saudi Arabia’s actions are primarily self-interested, aiming to send positive economic signals to Tehran to ensure that Riyadh’s relations with Tehran remain stable amidst the pursuit of normalization with Israel. Conservative factions in Iran, bolstered by what they perceive as the success of Iran’s Operation True Promise in altering Arab security considerations initially driving interest in normalization, advocate for engaging in mutually beneficial economic relations that are difficult to sever. This emerging strategy could also strengthen Iran’s position in negotiations with the U.S., signaling that it would not be a straightforward proposition for Washington to reduce its presence in the region and support Israel without offering concessions to Iran.
