Gold Traders’ Strike: Concessions amid Legislative Discord:
As the gold traders’ strike enters its third week, the ministry of industry, mining, and trade has retreated from its previous stance by withdrawing its requirement for the registration of gold inventories, the main cause of the strikes. While potentially temporary, this concession reflects the administration’s strategy to manage the ongoing conflict, despite attempts by hardline media to portray the gold traders’ demands as excessive. However, just as a resolution seemed imminent, remarks by an MP arguing that gold traders should not be an exception rekindled dissatisfaction, leading to renewed hesitancy about resumption of business. Unless the Twelfth Majles, which officially convenes in a few weeks, aligns with the administration on this matter, things could escalate into another point of contention between the executive and the legislature.
Impacts of Sanctions on Iran-China Economic Relations:
In its analysis of sluggishness in Iran-China economic relations and Iran’s increased need for investments and technology imports from China, a hardline outlet has acknowledged that external challenges, such as sanctions and Iran’s rejection of international treaties like the FATF, have strained the “strategic” bond between the two countries. It is noteworthy that the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim has acknowledged the peak in trade between Tehran and Beijing during the JCPoA—a rare admission that may signal a shift in tone among hardliners toward the nuclear agreement. Observers note that domestic issues, such as currency rate instability, bureaucratic hurdles, and Iran’s general unpreparedness for development, further deter Chinese investments. While seemingly a domestic matter, these challenges are often deeply rooted in the impact of sanctions.
Fallout from High-Profile Corruption Case:
Judiciary Chief Gholamhosein Mohseni-Eje’i has announced the sentencing of the Ra’isi administration’s former minister of agricultural jihad to three years in prison in the Debsh tea corruption case, which reportedly involves embezzlement to the tune of $3.4 billion. Mohseni-Eje’i’s focus on major corruption may fundamentally reflect an effort to respond to public sensitivity regarding high-profile cases, including some he listed in a recent speech but notably omitting the alleged land grab charges involving Kazem Seddiqi, the interim Friday prayer leader of Tehran. Although the Debsh tea case traces back to the Rouhani administration, it casts a significant shadow over Ebrahim Ra’isi’s anti-corruption claims, especially since he was the Judiciary chief during Rouhani’s tenure and campaigned for the presidency on an anti-corruption platform.
Iran’s Nuclear Posture: Threat or Bluff?:
Remarks that Iran could go nuclear if Israel attacked its nuclear sites have raised more of a stir domestically than in international circles, all the more so after Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to the supreme leader, doubled down on those remarks a day or two after he first made them. A typical reformist response is that this is more an indication of Iran’s desire for deterrence than any intention to actually own the bomb, which “of course” the Islamic Republic would not want as indicated by the supreme leader’s non-nuclearization fatwa. But another reformist response, such as that by former Rouhani administration official Abbas Akhundi, shows alarm. Akhundi believes Kharrazi’s threat is imprudent and could lead to undesirable outcomes for Iran’s security. The hardline Javan outlet looks at China as a good model, in that in 1964 it tested a nuclear device after initially dismissing it but subsequently realizing the country was defenseless against a nuclear attack by the U.S. Javan also reiterated a best-case scenario that others have posited, namely, that this could be a tactic on Iran’s part to pressure the Biden administration into returning to the negotiating table.
Iran’s Piggy Bank Looking To Recoup Losses:
Iran’s National Development Fund (NDF) now counts the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), a subsidiary of the ministry of petroleum, as its biggest debtor—an incomprehensible loop because the revenue that feeds the NDF comes entirely from the NIOC. Among other functions, the NDF was conceptualized as Iran’s rainy-day fund that would also spur production. The governor of the NDF says none of this is happening because the borrowing from it, including during the Ra’isi administration, has been high—to the tune of $100 billion—and repayments have been either negligible or in the form of non-cash assets. And now, he complains, the Expediency Discernment Council and its chairman, Sadeq Amoli-Larijani, are standing in the way of the NDF investing in upstream oil and gas projects to make up its deficits. That body, however, is not the only opponent of the idea; so, apparently, is the Supreme Audit Court of the Majles. Amoli-Larijani’s objections to the plan are based on the supposed lack of investment expertise at the NDF.
Iranian Government Biting (or Ignoring) Hand That Feeds It:
Leaders of Iran’s petrochemical industry are displeased over the government’s negligence of their contributions to Iran’s export earnings. They are reminding policymakers that their contribution to Iran’s exports was over $18.6 billion last year, accounting for nearly 38 percent of all non-petroleum exports. They are also pointing out that over the last five years their industry has returned 85 percent of its foreign currency earnings to the Central Bank of Iran. Their complaints center on the government’s shortcomings in the following areas: 1) lack of investment and planning to increase natural gas production; 2) non-payment of debts owed to petrochemical companies; and 3) tying the industry’s hands by enforcing a narrow 15-day window for them to remit their earnings. In short, they are demanding better treatment by reminding the government of their crucial role in filling the state’s coffers and improving Iran’s balance of trade.
Challenges Mount for Iran’s Steel Industry:
Iran’s steel industry, one of the country’s most lucrative sectors after oil and petrochemicals, is facing significant challenges and is rapidly losing its markets to China, Turkey, and Russia. Industry insiders point to two major issues: the increase in export duties and the requirement for exporters to fulfill their foreign exchange obligations through the NIMA currency system. These factors are directly tied to the government’s struggles with controlling liquidity and inflation, which are in turn largely a result of sanctions. Additional problems, such as energy imbalances leading to power outages for this industry and challenges in securing natural gas supplies, are also heavily influenced by sanctions.
Azerbaijan-Taliban Alliance Fuels Worries in Tehran:
Concerns are rising about the Republic of Azerbaijan’s engagements with countries that have border tensions with Tehran. In addition to Baku’s trilateral alliance with Israel and Pakistan, its recent handover of the Afghan embassy to the Taliban has stirred worries in Tehran. Observers perceive mutual interests between Kabul and Baku in diminishing Iran’s regional influence and undermining the influence of Shiism, as well as the Persian language and civilization. They believe Iran’s focus on the Middle East has somewhat distracted it from the Caucasus, allowing rivals to expand their influence. They advise authorities to change their approach to this region, both in terms of soft power and military initiatives, to counter this influence. The Taliban have announced support for Baku in its conflict with Armenia, and Baku’s ambassador in Kabul has worked extensively with the Taliban in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to exclude Iran from the region’s economic lifelines.
Chinese Connections, Corruption in Tehran Municipality:
Allegations of Mafia-style corruption involving state-owned Chinese companies have driven the city of Tehran to start a campaign of justification over its purchase of 2,000 buses from a Chinese firm in the face of questions from domestic automakers and the public. Posters on buses and in metro stations throughout the city list the city government’s reasons, but the outcry is not dying down. Domestic automakers are frustrated with the municipality’s non-payment of their previous contracts and the fact that the city bypassed them for the current bus purchase. Donya-e-Eqtesad, however, raises another point of contention: the fact that “support for domestic production” policy, which prohibits the purchase of foreign goods when comparable domestic products exist, does not apply to the city government of Tehran.
Blaming Western Lifestyle for Iran’s Low Birth Rate:
Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi is accusing the Ra’isi administration of manufacturing “success” stories in connection with a higher birth rate, whereas figures show a negligible shift from 1.65 to 1.66 children for women of childbearing age—a far cry from the desired target of 2.5. Abdi sees no sustainable plan to address the decline, condemning data reported by the administration as a deceptive and irresponsible shirking of responsibility. Abdolhosein Khosrowpanah-Dezfuli, the secretary of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, inadvertently undermines the administration’s claim, offering a mea culpa of sorts with his admission that the Nezam has lost opportunities over the past two decades to treat family-related problems with the seriousness they deserve. Himself a cleric, he acknowledges the shortcomings of religious leaders in not heeding the supreme leader’s warnings, which has led to people caring for cats and dogs instead of having children.
