Anticipated Labor Unrest in New Year
Labor rejected a 35-percent bump in wages in the year 1403 pushed through by the Supreme Labor Council, which is controlled by the Ra’isi administration. With inflation at 43 percent, a labor representative justified the stance—given the legal requirement for wages to keep pace with inflation, as acknowledged by Ebrahim Ra’isi himself before he was president. A forecast of 67-percent inflation in the new year renders the proposed wage increase even more meaningless and, in combination with an anticipated rise in the price of fuel, threatens to fan the flames of protest. Newly elected hardline MP Hamid Rasa’i, who should be an administration ally, nonetheless criticized the decision, though his position may be little more than populist posturing.
Outcry over Corruption by Clerics Growing
Pressure is mounting for prosecution in the land grab by Kazem Seddiqi because of its implications for the Nezam’s utter loss of support. The state-approved ISNA states boldly that Seddiqi himself is not cognizant of the damage he is doing to the Islamic Republic’s reputation. Lambasting Seddiqi’s melodramatic sermons, the reformist Mohammad-Taqi Fazel-Meibodi argues that his sanctimony and hypocrisy have completely embarrassed the clerical class. “Justice seekers” Vahid Ashtari and Ali Qolhaki raise uncomfortable questions that Seddiqi has yet to answer, such as why a “forger” would show far greater interest in enriching Seddiqi than himself. Hardline IRGC man Yadollah Javani feels differently, warning those in pursuit of justice not to go too far.
High-Stakes Oil Agreements
The ministry of petroleum has signed significant agreements with domestic exploration companies, backed by investments from Iranian banks, to enhance crude oil production capacity. These efforts, coupled with a recent deal to improve gas field pressure, underscore the urgent focus on revitalizing the energy sector, which has suffered from a worrying decline due to prolonged underinvestment and neglect, further aggravated by sanctions. Nonetheless, concerns arise due to the opacity of contract details and the identities of the participating companies, which are not genuinely private. Other issues include the unconstitutional practice of using oil to settle government debts to the National Development Fund and the growing dominance of China and Russia in Iran’s oil industry through partnerships with companies that are only nominally private.
Iran-Russia Military Ties Deepen amid Concerns
Observers are concerned over rumors of Iran transferring ballistic missiles to Russia, fearing a strategic trap potentially laid by Russia that could derail Iran’s diplomatic efforts and escalate regional tensions. However, there is mounting evidence of a growing partnership and tactical alignment between Tehran and Moscow, benefiting both nations. Missile exports to Russia afford Iran the opportunity to indirectly test military capabilities in real battlefield conditions, bolster the credibility of its defense industry, and strengthen its stance as a significant power among anti-Western countries, thereby enhancing its non-nuclear deterrence. The increasing interest in military collaboration with Russia and China may be due to a recognition of the resistance front’s shortcomings in terms of Iran’s security, as exposed during the Gaza conflict.
Oil-for-Infrastructure Deal with China
Chinese companies are set to embark on construction projects in Iran in 2024, including housing and sports stadiums, through an oil-for-goods exchange designed to alleviate the impacts of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy. However, experts criticize this initiative as a misallocation of oil revenues that could be better utilized on priorities like developing solar power plants to address energy deficits. There is speculation about the administration’s motives for selecting these construction projects: either they are aimed at showcasing “presentable achievement” ahead of upcoming elections or they have been chosen for their sanctions-proof nature, with Chinese firms being less likely to withdraw due to the punitive measures.
Zarif, Again, Dishes on Nezam
According to a new audio file obtained by expatriate website IranWire, former minister of foreign affairs Mohammad-Javad “Bombshell” Zarif has leveled explicit and implicit criticism at many forces and centers of power in the Islamic Republic after the 1 March election. Zarif has accused fellow reformists of having become too greedy for change too soon, with attempts to erode the power of the supreme leader through constitutional revisions beginning in the late 1990s. In fact, he considers reformists far more adept than their conservative rivals of monopolizing power. In keeping with the “realism” prevalent in Iranian politics, Zarif considers it reasonable—if not necessarily laudable—for the supreme leader to eliminate the reformists in return. As for the recent election, Zarif believes the major orchestrators were former IRGC commander Mohammad-Ali Ja’fari and his former deputy at the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Hosein Ta’eb. Iran’s former top diplomat also makes a strange distinction between “the hard nucleus of power” in the Islamic Republic and the supreme leader, as if the former were more powerful than the latter.
Transforming the Caucasus?
Observers are hopeful that recent conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine are catalyzing the transformation of the Caucasus into an economic nexus that bridges the interests of three major players—Iran, Turkey, and Russia—despite their rivalries. The Rasht-Astara railway project, scheduled to commence in 2024, emerges as a pivotal element of the North-South Transit Corridor (NSTC), symbolizing this newfound cooperation. Underscoring their critical importance, this railway and another corridor offering Turkey access for its import needs have drawn a Russian commitment to Iran for a $1.4 billion loan. Leveraging Moscow’s reliance on the NSTC, Tehran is seizing the opportunity to upgrade its infrastructure through Russian investments, aligning itself with the shift towards a more multipolar world order. Whatever the challenges and uncertainties, observers believe mutual needs have even compelled Turkey into a more calculated approach in its dealings with Baku and Tehran.
Predicting ‘Tsunami’ of Jobless Poor
Using data from government research centers, well-known economist Farshad Mo’meni questions the government’s cost-of-living adjustment policies. He asks why, in a country with 30 percent of the population living in poverty and another 40 percent about to join them, the government has not adjusted wages for blue-collar workers upwards. Officials talk about a 20-percent increase when the official inflation rate is 40 percent, and they seem serious about enforcing hijab “because it is the law,” but their enthusiasm for the law drops off considerably on economic matters. Mo’meni fears a “tsunami” of jobless poor due to the government’s failed policies.
Internal Rivalries, Strategic Alliances
The contentious rivalry among conservative representatives of the yet-to-commence Twelfth Majles has sparked concern within conservative circles, evident in media outlets affiliated with the IRGC. These outlets increasingly worry about the potential impact on public trust in the government and the international perception of unity within the Nezam, especially given the pivotal role the Majles can play during the presidential election of 2025. Meanwhile, Majles Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf is reportedly engaging in dialogue with newly elected moderate and reformist MPs to form a coalition against hardline factions. With vocal support for Qalibaf emerging from these circles, it is highly likely for him to retain his speakership position, even after ranking fourth among Tehran MPs in the election.
‘Look East’ Policy: Display of Military Strength
Defense Minister Mohammadreza Qara’i-Ashtiani believes the Islamic Republic is achieving self-sufficiency in defense and aerospace production and rapidly turning into an exporter of military hardware, recording an increase of 400–500 percent in such exports to neighbors like Armenia, Qatar, Turkey, and Russia. Referring to the “Maritime Security Belt-2024” in which China, Russia, and Iran are conducting military exercises in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman this week, he called it a show of force by three major powers. An international relations expert’s assessment was that Iran is deepening relations with China and Russia beyond economic and diplomatic matters and creating something akin to a security pact.
Women: Thorn in Side of Islamic Republic
Women’s rights advocate Ashraf Borujerdi has identified one of the problems concerning women in Iran, to wit, that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic frames women not as individual citizens but as contributors of value only in a family setting. Today’s women, however, have moved well beyond such a limited perspective, which has only widened the gulf between them and the current crop of Iran’s political leaders. She believes women will increasingly be making their own choices over dress and travel, even political involvement. Others have noted how the nation’s elective bodies have done, and continue to do, very little to advance women’s causes. Perhaps that is because they see them as the enemy. Sociologist Mehran Sowlati believes women who raise their voices and bring up questioning children will become a “nightmare” for totalitarian systems.
