What is there to say about the Hamas attack on Israel that is equal to its enormity and savagery? One sees it compared to Pearl Harbor, to the surprise October 1973 war that this attack seems to echo, and to the 11 September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Each has its merits as an analogy, but perhaps 9/11 is the best comparison, because of the sheer horror and brutality of the attacks, the anger and emotions they have produced (and indeed were intended to produce), and because of their overwhelmingly political and theatrical goals. This was not an attack with understandable military objectives, such as sinking the US Pacific Fleet or regaining occupied territory, but one that sought to horrify and humiliate, and to inspire a sort of savage hope, a faith in violence, in a hopeless and despairing Palestinian population. Unlike Pearl Harbor or the 1973 War, moreover, this attack is unlikely to lead to a clean resolution, like the surrender of the Japanese, or a truce and process of negotiations that, eventually, restored the Sinai to Egypt. In that it is also like 9/11.
There is much that is still not clear about the attack. A central question, of course, is the degree of Iranian foreknowledge and active participation in the planning and organization of the Hamas offensive. As of this writing, the Israeli and US governments suspect an Iranian role, but admit that they have no evidence or proof of active Iranian involvement. Two newspapers—The Wall Street Journal and L’Orient Le Jour—have published stories citing sources in Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” that say IRGC Qods Force officers worked with counterparts in Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad for several months to plan the attack. Earlier this year, after a lesser rocket barrage on Israel, a Lebanese journalist told Axios that “any action” carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (a smaller, more pro-Iranian junior partner to Hamas) had to “pass through” IRGC Qods Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Qa’ani or the Hizballah official in charge of liaison with the IRGC. It is all very plausible, and the attack would seem to serve several Iranian interests—not least the derailing of the US effort to broker a normalization of Israeli relations with Saudi Arabia. But, we should remember that after the bombing of Pan Am 109 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 the initial assessment was that the bombing had been conducted by a radical Palestinian group at the behest of Iran—and not, as the investigation later determined, by operatives from Libya. So, in this case, as in the case of Lockerbie, it is perhaps wise to keep an open mind and let our judgments be guided by the evidence and not by our assumptions.
At a time when the initial reaction to the Hamas attack has been grief, anger, remorse, and an understandable desire for revenge, what is perhaps most needed is to be as dispassionate as possible in our efforts to understand what has happened and why. It will not be easy. Already there are accusations, rooted in our toxic and profoundly stupid partisan politics, that permitting the Iranians limited access to some of their frozen funds somehow empowered Iran to help Hamas to mount this attack—a charge that ignores that the reports of Iranian involvement in the planning strongly suggest that it predated the deal on frozen assets. More sincere have been well-meaning if unimaginative assessments that the conflict is in part the outcome of the power “vacuum” in the Middle East and the failure of the US to establish effective deterrence—which overlooks that the United States still has some 30,000 troops in multiple bases around the region and in July increased that number by ten percent with the deployment of an amphibious readiness group and a Marine Expeditionary Unit with 3,000 marines; the United States also has continued the practice of periodic flights of US strategic bombers from the US to the Middle East, with a total of 16 such flights made since late 2020. Increasing our military presence in the region is a costly case of just doing more of what we have always done—much like our economic sanctions on Iran—without questioning whether such actions produce the results we seek.
Similarly, calls to increase pressure on Iran overlook that the US was already upping the pressure by trying to advance Saudi-Israeli normalization under the Abraham Accords, which, if successful, would have further isolated Iran in the region and shifted the regional balance even further against it. Tehran intervened in the Syrian civil war in part because it feared the fall of Asad would shift the regional balance against it, so we should not be surprised that it would look for ways to prevent an Israeli-Saudi accord. If indeed Iran played a role in the Hamas attack, it has shown again that it has the power to play the spoiler, but little else. It cannot offer or promote an alternative order in the region that will gain any traction.
Unfortunately, in the current atmosphere of rage and revenge, calls for restraint or a rethinking of the premises of our policies are unlikely to gain much of a hearing. After the bloodletting of the Hamas attack, Israeli leaders will want to destroy Hamas if they can, or cripple it so it cannot launch an attack of similar magnitude for years. One can hardly blame them. But they should also remember that Iran can ill afford to stand by while one of its clients is annihilated. The Islamic Republic’s ability to deter and defend against attacks depends on its ability to maintain the loyalty and support of its many different client militias throughout the region. If Israel tries to destroy Hamas we may see Iran, through Hizballah and other groups, try to widen the war. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s public insistence that Iran was not involved in the attack suggests he is not interested in a wider war whose consequences may be very negative for Iran and the region, but like the European statesmen in July 1914, he may find that his obligations, fears, and the tide of events will pull Iran into a war no one wants.
Former US CENTCOM commander General (retd.) Joseph Votel has said that the Hamas attack is a “game-changer for the region.” If so, we need to change our gameplan in the region. Calls for more military presence, more sanctions, and more pressure are from a well-worn playbook that at best only addresses symptoms and not the underlying conditions. It might be possible through a great exertion of force and coercion to restore a precarious calm to the region, but it will be only a matter of time before those who are dissatisfied with the status quo try again to overturn it. Distasteful as it may seem, if we continue to refuse to accommodate Iran’s interests, or ameliorate the grievances of the Palestinians, we will continue to have to react and respond to grotesque acts of violence such as this Hamas attack.
