Politics are usually about more than the actual issue at stake. Politics is, of course, a struggle for power, but it can also be a wrangle over money and resources, or a clash of opposing values. And don’t forget the influence of ego and personal ambition. In that marvelous 1994 film The Madness of King George, the Lord Chancellor Edward Thurlow, recognizing that William Pitt’s Tory government is losing support and likely to fall, meets privately with the Whig leader Charles Fox to negotiate his defection to the Whigs. “What do you want?” demands Fox; “Why, the good of the country,” replies Thurlow. Met with Fox’s cynical, impatient stare, Thurlow adds, “To be the Lord Chancellor.” No doubt in Thurlow’s mind, there was no contradiction between the two goals. He would have felt right at home in the rough and tumble politics of the Islamic Republic.
The selection of articles in this week’s newsletter showcases the multidimensional aspect of Iranian domestic politics, and the different motivations and interests at work, whether the issue is the continuing effort to enforce observance of hijab, reform of the voting system, or the opportunity to win the support of Iran’s beleaguered middle class. Our featured article, in particular, illuminates an issue that, very subtly, is growing more salient in Iranian politics: who will succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? The topic is rarely discussed directly in the Iranian media, but as Khamenei ages—he is either 84 or about to turn 84, depending on the source—the different factions and political players in Iran are getting their ducks in a row in anticipation of his imminent departure.
Last Friday’s prayer sermons, as analyzed in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, is a case in point. Although the Eid al-Ghadir holiday commemorates an important event in Shia Islam, that is, the Prophet Muhammad’s designation of Ali as his successor, this year the Nezam is making an outsized effort to emphasize the significance of the occasion, including a massive parade and extensive media coverage. The tone and tenor of the Friday sermons, with their focus on the qualifications for velayat—the absolute guardianship wielded by the Supreme Leader—the importance of his designation by God, and the obligation to give him complete obedience, all suggest an effort to lay the groundwork for the succession. As these sermons come at a time when there is renewed discussion of whether religious and political qualifications or descent from the Prophet should be more important for leadership of the Muslim community, and even the open suggestion that Khamenei’s son Mojtaba might prove to be an appropriate candidate for Leader, it seems likely that the different candidates and stakeholders in the Nezam are looking ahead to the transition.
The anticipation of the succession of a new leader adds an additional dimension to the ongoing debates and political infighting in Iran. It raises the stakes. Just as things got bad for the Israelites after “there arose up a new king over Egypt, which knew not Joseph,” Iran’s political elites risk marginalization if they back the wrong candidate for the succession or otherwise represent a threat to the new Leader’s agenda or power. The long decline and marginalization of Iran’s reformists—the political “left” in the Islamic Republic—followed closely after the decidedly conservative Khamenei’s accession to the position of Supreme Leader.
Against the backdrop of a potential near-term succession, the debate over how best to enforce the law on hijab has become more than a struggle among competing agendas and values: it is a contest to define the nature of the Islamic Republic. The hijab issue is an arena that allows different stakeholders to promote their vision of what sort of Islamic Republic Iran should have. A definition that prioritizes the strict enforcement of the law on an unwilling society would tend to favor the emergence of a hardline leader, with good ties to the more hardline circles in the security forces, and proven willingness and ability to use force to maintain order. A more relaxed approach to hijab—it is exceedingly unlikely any potential Supreme Leader would jettison hijab altogether—that prioritizes taking public opinion into consideration would tend to benefit candidates who are perceived as more capable at gaining and retaining popular support.
In a similar fashion, the preparations for the Majles elections scheduled for next year, and the competition to control the Majles take on greater urgency than usual. It has become more than a struggle over the opportunity to control and distribute the political spoils and advance political careers; it is now about which faction will be positioned to “prepare the battlefield” in anticipation of a succession. If the hardline Paydari Front, which has favored strict hijab laws, gains enough seats in the next election to control the Majles, one can expect not only more draconian legislation to be passed, but greater exertions to sideline the Front’s more moderate and pragmatic principlist rivals, such as current Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former Speaker Ali Larijani, and other less ideological members of the conservative establishment. The recent removal of Ali Shamkhani from the Supreme National Security Council may have been an early first shot in such a campaign. It is little wonder that, as reported in the PersuMedia Daily Summary, the moderates are exploring coalitions among themselves and some of the less radical reformists, as well as strategizing how to turn out and attract middle class voters.
We probably should avoid the temptation, however, to over-analyze this. A cigar is often just a cigar, and routine politics continue in Iran. A given political act may be motivated, as before, primarily by more mundane objectives. The recent exposure of likely corruption on the part of Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Alamolhoda by a rightwing, “justice-seeking” activist, may have been just another one of his many Quixotic efforts to bring corrupt and powerful officials to book. But because Alamolhoda is also the father-in-law of President and potential candidate for Supreme Leader Ebrahim Ra’isi, the accusation of corruption takes on an added dimension that Ra’isi’s rivals might seek to exploit. As the year progresses, Iran’s political players increasingly are likely to factor into their decisions how a given action or event may affect the succession to Khamenei, because the outcome of the succession may strongly influence their own political fortunes. Buckle up—it’s likely to be a bumpy flight.
