Iranian media outlets overwhelmingly, almost monotonously, seem to see only positive developments and no negative ones from Operation True Promise, Iran’s name for its drone and missile attack on Israel in the early hours of 14 April (late afternoon/early evening of 13 April in the U.S.). By and large, these outlets claim the action projected the Islamic Republic’s strength both internationally and domestically. Only a smattering of opinions has considered adverse consequences from a potential Israeli counter-strike.
The hardline outlet Rahbord-e Mo’aser glides past questions over the military effectiveness of Iran’s attack on Israel to consider its propaganda value and the “growing popularity” of Iran in the Islamic world (which is so far unsupported by any polling). Pointing out that Iran is the only country in the region to have engaged Israel militarily since the Hamas attacks in October 2023, it traces responses on social media such as X to conclude that Iran has symbolically seized leadership in the Muslim world—at least on the Palestinian issue—and brushed aside the “ostentatious” displays of Qatar and Türikiye. Editorializing in Kayhan, hardline commentator Sa’dollah Zare’i suggested Iran’s attack had inflicted great military and intelligence damage on Israel, characterizing it as the first such military response to Israel by any country since Egypt’s action in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. According to Zare’i, the help Western countries gave Israel in tracking and knocking down Iran’s projectiles did not blunt the force of the “precision” attacks, especially on an unnamed airbase close to Israel’s Dimona nuclear site. Furthermore, Iran used the airspace of supposedly friendly neighbors (such as Iraq and Syria, for instance, where the U.S. has a military presence) to strike at Israel. Writing from his perch in London, even the reformist Ata’ollah Mohajerani waxes hyperbolic about the effects of Iran’s one-day strike on Israel, claiming it has forever buried both the Abraham Accords and the Jewish state’s dream of rising to be the region’s technological leader. Abdolreza Faraji-Rad, a former diplomat, focuses on the “You’re on your own” message from the Biden administration to Israel should it choose to hit back at Iran.
The non-ideological pundit Abdolrahman Qahramanpur-Bonab (Rahman Qaharamanpur) is one of the few voices seeing potential downsides, suggesting that Israel could decide to hit back and potentially touch off an unending cycle of strikes and counter-strikes. He does not believe, however, that Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear sites because the West would stay its hand. He also acknowledges that, unlike Iran, Israel has never militarily attacked the territory of its number one enemy. Furthermore, inasmuch as Iran has never engaged in “self-care” by forging alliances with others, it could find itself alone if or when an Israeli attack came. Former ambassador Mohammad-Qasem Mohebbali says countries in the region that see themselves as vulnerable to such attacks from Iran—say Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—may strengthen their alliance with the West for added protection. The Western-educated international affairs analyst Yusef Mowla’i makes a few subtle but important points about the situation. He clarifies, for instance, that despite Iran’s insistence on “legitimate defense,” international law imposes certain conditions for a military response, such as immediacy and necessity. This is bound to raise the question of whether Iran’s attack on Israel was immediately necessary. Furthermore, as far as international law is concerned, such military actions need a green light from the UN Security Council—a double-edged sword that could limit options for both Israel and Iran. Former diplomat and commentator Morteza Musavi-Khalkhali says the motivation is greater for Israel to hit back than to exercise restraint given Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s political calculus. As for how Israel might go about it, Caucasus analyst Ehsan Movahhedian suggests the Republic of Azerbaijan as a possible launchpad for Israel. Such a view, however, may be colored by Movahhedian’s hostility toward the government of Ilham Aliyev, who at this stage would have no discernible reason for incurring Iran’s wrath.
Other commentators were eager to tout the domestic benefits of the attack. MP Mohammad-Saleh Jowkar contended the operation brought “joy” to the people of Iran, enhancing social trust and showcasing the Islamic Republic’s deterrence capability against external enemies. Fellow MP Ahmad Rastineh-Hafshejani, a Paydari Front legislator, seems far more interested in saber-rattling. Ignoring questions on many people’s minds about how Iran can characterize its strike on Israel as a “deterrent” if Israel escalates the conflict by hitting back, he promises Iran’s response to any further Israeli action will be “ruinous” for the Jewish state. The hardline Javan seems gleeful about the supposedly unifying effects of Iran’s attack among Iranian citizens except, of course, for such “nags” as reformist commentators Sadeq Zibakalam and Abbas Abdi.
