The Islamic Republic’s “Operation True Promise” has supposedly punished Israel for the targeted assassination of senior IRGC Quds Force officer Mohammadreza Zahedi a little less than two weeks ago. With one notable difference, that chastisement bears a close resemblance to the Islamic Republic’s “punishment” of the United States after the Trump administration’s targeted assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. In that attack, the IRGC lobbed missiles at the Ayn al-Asad base in Iraq after communicating its intentions to the U.S., which allowed American troops there to take cover and avoid casualties. The difference now is that projectiles launched from Iranian territory were headed directly for the home soil of the country being punished, making this the first time in its 45-year history that the Islamic Republic has attacked Israel directly.
Public Posture, Behind-the-Scenes Positioning
The officially expressed sentiment from Tehran is one of satisfaction. Most major newspapers, regardless of political leaning, celebrated Iran’s “triumph” and Israel’s “humiliation.” The Nezam seemed to be signaling an intention to keep pundits and opinion-makers in line. The day after the attacks, a number of reformist news sites (Didban-e Iran, Sharq, Hammihan, etc.) briefly became inaccessible. Furthermore, whether prompted to do so or speaking of their own volition, many commentators of the non-hardline persuasion either nodded in vigorous assent or engaged in a measure of hyperbole, as if the launch of missiles and slow drones at Israel, most of them tracked and shot down, represented a game changer. That kind of assessment may or may not be borne out by the passage of time, but it is premature right now given the weakened state of the Nezam due to trials and tribulations at home. One should also not lose sight of the fact that many of the reformists so readily rallying around the flag were earlier cautioning the Nezam against reckless actions that could put Iran on a direct warpath with Israel. At any rate, hardline spokesmen of the regime expressed the notion that Iran’s attacks had closed a chapter on this episode of Iran-Israel confrontation. In the words of Mohammad-Hosein Baqeri, the chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff, “From Iran’s point of view, Operation True Promise is concluded and there is no intention for it to continue.” Likewise, under the rubric of “legitimate defense,” Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian tweeted that Iran had accomplished its goal and did not intend to continue “defensive” action. Ditto for the country’s Supreme National Security Council.
Reaction of Markets
The economic outlet Donya-e-Eqtesad speculated about two possible scenarios about the market reaction in Iran. The first is the volatility and uncertainty associated with Israel’s possible retaliation and the wider regional conflict. The second scenario, however, revolves around the unpredictability and anxiety that dominated the market after the Israel attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. The sentiment is that now that Iran has retaliated, the market may stabilize and return to normalcy. Donya-e-Eqtesad argues that the reaction of the foreign exchange market supports this end-of-anxiety and stability scenario. Javan and Kayhan, both hardline outlets, also reported a decrease in demand and the price of the U.S. dollar in the currency market. In contrast, the price of crude oil has increased around the world, according to Mehr News. Because it has only been two days since the attack, the first scenario about the added political risk and widening of the war in the region which will adversely affect the market is still a possibility, but for now there seems to be a degree of relief in the Iranian market.
Catalysts and Calculations
Numerous factors likely influenced Iran’s decision to respond directly and extensively utilizing its missile and drone capabilities. The Israeli attack on the Iranian consular building in Damascus seems to have served as the tipping point, rendering this response seemingly inevitable, a viewpoint echoed by many reformist-leaning observers. According to analyst Ali Bigdeli, following the Israeli strike in Syria, both domestic and international pressures for a reaction were palpable, albeit with various intentions. Conventional tactics, such as deploying resistance forces or seizing ships, would have fallen short of meeting these heightened expectations. While hardliners clamored for a forceful and deterrent response, others—even those loyal to the establishment—questioned Ali Khamenei’s perceived red lines. Concurrently, the Nezam faced scrutiny regarding its ability to uphold its security promises, particularly after the Israeli assault on Iranian military commanders in Syria was followed by subsequent terrorist attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan. The official narrative defending Iran’s regional activities, including its involvement in Syria, had always centered on security, yet this narrative now faced serious questions. Moreover, domestic policies, such as hijab enforcement, were cynically and mockingly juxtaposed with Iran’s perceived inaction towards Israel. Some speculate that the decision to launch the attack was also influenced by negotiations between Iran and the U.S. through various mediators. Following those negotiations, Iran may have concluded that a demonstration of its missile and UAV capabilities would not elicit further Israeli retaliation. Such a response was also deemed necessary to send a signal to resistance forces, particularly those in Syria. There is widespread speculation regarding the involvement of Syrian informants who may have leaked information about Iranian military officials that precipitated the Israeli attacks. Nonetheless, for Iran to maintain its “achievements” and leadership position within these forces, it appeared imperative to demonstrate its capacity to confront Israel directly.
Potential Israeli Retaliation, International Ramifications
While speculation abounds in both reformist and conservative circles regarding the restoration of Iran’s deterrence power through its response and the unlikelihood of Israeli retaliation, statements from senior officials paint a more cautious picture. While many officials assert that the response operation has concluded, they also issue warnings against further actions should Israel retaliate. This has sparked discussions in Tehran regarding the prospect of sustained tensions and potential responses from other countries. Some warn that military actions by Israel or the U.S. against Iranian territory could prompt Iran to test a nuclear weapon, while others anticipate limited Israeli responses leading to continued but controlled tensions. Amidst this uncertainty, questions arise regarding the level of support Iran could expect from allies like Russia in the event of war. Iranian academic Ahmad Vakhshiteh, based in Russia, argues that while Moscow would strive to prevent an Israeli attack, it is unlikely to provide military support to Iran if an attack were to occur. Most observers agree that both Iran and the United States prefer to avoid further escalation, but heightened tensions could force other nations to choose sides.
A significant concern voiced in both reformist and moderate conservative outlets is the perceived lack of effective media coverage, diplomatic discourse, and lobbying efforts inside and outside the country to convey Iran’s narrative and portray its actions as legitimate defense to garner support from other nations.
