In response to the recent UK-chaired UNSC session on Iran’s implementation of UNSCR 2231 and the comments by the IAEA chief regarding the “unsatisfactory” cooperation between Iran and the nuclear watchdog, observers, mainly in the reformist camp, are exhibiting a range of mixed emotions including fear, disappointment, and regret. However, they maintain hope that Iran can develop a new strategy to mitigate the impact of negative news on the Iranian markets.
Analysts such as former diplomat Kurosh Ahmadi and Hasan Behestipur hold the belief that European countries, driven by concerns over the potential radicalization of Iran’s nuclear program, are not ultimately inclined to activate the trigger mechanism in the JCPoA. Unconcerned with Rafael Grossi’s comments about Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, Behestipur argues that Iran should engage in direct and transparent discussions with the United States to expedite a resolution. Conversely, Ahmadi suggests that until Tehran convinces the Europeans that it does not provide military assistance to Russia, relations between Tehran and Brussels will not normalize. Former diplomat Fereidun Majlesi takes a different stance, considering the activation of the trigger mechanism a possibility. He even believes that the removal of Special Envoy Robert Malley from the American team is a piece of the plans in preparation for the expiration date of the JCPoA. In his assessment, if Iran fails to reach an agreement or an understanding by the October deadline, all UN sanctions and resolutions could be reinstated. However, he expresses concern about internal conflicts of interest in Iran that could undermine any agreement, despite any administration’s efforts to negotiate. Former MP Heshamtollah Falahatpisheh shares a similar frustration regarding the interference of certain taboos, like direct talks with the U.S., with the country’s foreign policy. He acknowledges that this situation is driven more by economic considerations for certain groups than ideology. Nonetheless, he believes that the country’s twenty-year development plan, aimed at making Iran a strong regional player by 1404/2025, could provide a legal framework to overcome the foreign policy impasse. According to Falahatpisheh, constructive engagement with the world is a prerequisite for achieving this goal. Concerned about the negative impact of nuclear news regarding Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, another reformist outlet suggests that Iran should address another dispute with the IAEA or potentially disclose some elements of the negotiations in Oman. This outlet suggests that the approach could help counteract negative signals from either Grossi or Western countries.
However, a tweet from Nour News, an outlet closely associated with the Supreme National Security Council, strikes a more cautionary tone towards Europe than what the reformist outlet had hoped. The outlet warns, both in Persian and English, that European countries’ failure to address the lifting of missile and drone sanctions stipulated in the JCPoA could lead to “compensatory measures by Iran in its peaceful nuclear activities.” Hardline outlets immediately interpreted this as a call to increase uranium enrichment. In a development that sheds light on the chaotic and competitive state among different power groups in Iran, the Majles committee on national security and foreign policy has concluded that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA aligns with the “strategic action to lift sanctions and protect Iran’s national interests.” This finding stands in contrast to the earlier claim made by another committee heavily influenced by the hardline Paydari Front, which had asserted the opposite (Daily Summary of 6 July 2023: “Hardliners To Help or Sabotage Agreement with West”).
