Eid al-Ghadir is perhaps the most crucial of Shiite celebrations for the Islamic Republic—“crucial” because it marks the moment of the birth of Shiism’s defining characteristic, the imamate. Without the imamate, the concept of velayat on which the Islamic Republic is founded would be superfluous. Legitimation of the Islamic Republic is inextricably tied to this concept of velayat and the absolute guardianship of the jurist. As always, Friday prayer leaders (FPLs) used the occasion to emphasize the political leadership and the station of velayat on this anniversary celebration of Ghadir, which Shiites use to validate their claims against Sunnis.
What seems a bit different this year is the tone and tenor of statements coming from several FPLs that could be construed as addressing the current question of succession. Emphasizing the importance of Ghadir, the FPL of Karaj claimed it was not merely a celebratory event but one that shows “who has the merit of becoming the leader of the Muslim community.” He added that this was a political and governance problem and that the talk about velayat hinges on “a person who walks in the path of God and is upholding his commandments and laws.” In Yazd, the FPL posed a question to his audience: why would the leader of a community, religious or otherwise, not address the question of successor in his lifetime? Why would the Prophet, after much hardship in the creation of the Muslim community, leave it leaderless and adrift? The FPL in Shiraz also insisted that piety commands the faithful to listen wholeheartedly and obey the commands of vali-ye faqih in the absence of the Hidden Imam.
True, these sermons could simply be part of the general Ghadir celebration addressing the identity of Shiism on the one hand and the legitimation claims of the Islamic Republic on the other—a political entity that has justified its power based on the absolute custodial guardianship of the Islamic jurist. Yet, these same sermons could be addressing the current issue of succession at the same time. A case in point would be the FPL of Mashhad, Ahmad Alamolhoda. “In the current era,” he proclaimed, “any political movement that wants to acquire power would be a usurper if it is not aligned with the [supreme] leader.” Again, there is enough ambiguity in such pronouncements that would allow for multiple and even contradictory interpretations. Nevertheless, in today’s environment one cannot ignore the lessons of Ghadir for the succession to the de facto leader of “the Islamic community” and the necessity of submitting to his command. This is especially so when talk about Mojtaba Khamenei is resurfacing in the media as the most suitable of candidates, à la Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Whatever the specific intention of the FPLs or others, at the minimum what is being promoted is the legitimacy of political Islam and that of the station of velayat; the rest of the story about who will succeed Ali Khamenei as Iran’s supreme leader is a drama still waiting to be played out.
