The post-revolution history of elections and victorious candidates in Iran shows that the hijab issue has played a significant role in shaping the fate of political groups and candidates. Advocating for coercive hijab enforcement consistently has run the risk of discouraging the participation of a majority of Iranian society. This political climate has provided an opportunity for minority groups such as the hardline Paydari Front to benefit.
Recognizing the importance of addressing hijab to secure support from their respective voter bases, both the reformists and the Paydari camp have leveraged the influence of the issue on voting algorithms within Iranian society during elections. For reformists, the adoption of a more moderate stance has broadened their appeal among voters, especially those who believe in more progressive social policies. On the other hand, the hardline Paydari Front has capitalized on conservative sentiments surrounding hijab enforcement to rally its supporters. The dynamics surrounding the issue have undoubtedly shaped electoral outcomes in Iran, with candidates and political groups understanding the significance of aligning themselves with the prevailing sentiments of their constituents. It has become a subject that cannot be ignored or underestimated in the political landscape, as it can determine the level of voter participation and ultimately impact electoral success. Reviewing the events that unfolded in the months leading up to the presidential election of 1997, which unexpectedly brought the reformist Mohammad Khatami to power, it becomes evident that hijab played a significant role in his electoral success and the defeat of the conservative candidate at that time, Ali-Akbar Nateq-Nuri. In those days, millions of Iranians voted for Khatami because of the progressive contrast he represented, especially on women’s issues, with Nateq-Nuri during the debates. Conversely, in instances of low voter turnout where the conservative minority becomes ascendant, a liberal or moderate view towards hijab becomes a political liability among religious voters. Thus, Khatami’s moderate approach, which was a contributing factor in his electoral success in 1997, turned into a negative factor in 2005 when fewer voters went to the polls. In 2013, hijab again played a significant role in the presidential campaign of Hasan Rouhani, who cultivated an image of tolerance. Similarly, Paydari-affiliated politicians have been promoting coercive measures in hijab enforcement to appease religious constituents on the one hand, and to depress voter turnout on the other.
While hardline figures are apparently refusing to retreat from their initial attacks on the hijab bill, academic elites believe the Nezam’s interference in cultural matters will prove ineffective and exert adverse impacts on society. Among those who continued to launch attacks on the hijab and chastity bill were the cleric Mas’ud Ali from the Qom Seminary and Hosein Shari’atmadari, the editor-in-chief of Kayhan. In his criticism of the Hijab bill, a joint effort by the Judiciary and the Ra’isi administration, Shari’atmadari expressed displeasure at the downgrading of hijab violations from a crime to an offense. He also disagreed with the provision that restrains law enforcement from on-the-scene intervention and requires them to issue warnings first. Shari’atmadari criticized bills that bar the IRGC and Basij forces from addressing hijab violations. After a series of gatherings by religious groups in Tehran demanding a stricter approach to hijab and calling on the Majles to pass a more restrictive bill, Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf responded to such concerns by emphasizing that there would be no deliberate delay on the bill. In doing so, he betrayed a somewhat moderate approach to the issue, acknowledging that it is a divisive topic in society with the potential to polarize the country, and that any bill concerning the matter should be based on expert opinions and consider collective wisdom.
Meanwhile, a conference at the ministry of science attended by sociologists and university professors arrived at the consensus that the government should refrain from intervening in cultural matters. Participants concluded that any legislation regarding hijab would not achieve its intended objectives. In his presentation, Ebrahim Hajiani, the former head of the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), highlighted a poll by a seminary-affiliated institute that showed 52 percent of recent hijab violations occurring after strict enforcement under the Ra’isi administration. Hajiani added that 62 percent of Iran’s total population and 60 percent of religious women do not support government interference. Hasan Bonyanian, the head of the cultural policymaking task force of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, also criticized the politicization of hijab and its association with the Nezam’s efficacy in the Islamization of the nation. He warned against any ill-considered approach to hijab that could accelerate a departure from Islamic culture in society. A review of such analyses and warnings about the changes in the social composition of Iranian society alongside the state of participation in coming elections clearly demonstrates that the political calculus surrounding the hijab issue has shifted. However, the key factor lies in the fact that the population of both supporters and opponents of hijab changed after the unrest of last fall. The divergence within the conservative camp regarding how to deal with what is perceived as “improper” hijab on the street indicates an understanding of this change by a group of moderate conservatives, who have adopted a policy of tolerance and moderation. Hardliners, however, seek to lower the participation rate by passing stricter laws and maintaining dominance among a minority of voters.
