There are indications that persistent poverty in Iran is having effects that go beyond economic concerns and might, in fact, bleed into other areas, such as the people’s commitment to the Nezam or even adherence to religious faith.
An assessment of poverty in Iran by the Majles Research Center (MRC) highlights a widening poverty gap and intergenerational poverty as major concerns. According to the report, the poverty rate in Iran has risen to 30.5 percent in 2021–22, pushing 11 million individuals below the poverty line. The poverty gap has also increased, indicating an average 27-percent shortfall in income for those living in poverty compared to the poverty line. This suggests that persistently high inflation rates have exacerbated the severity of poverty. Overall, the MRC’s report on poverty in Iran highlights the growing poverty rate and reveals a complex composition of poverty in the country. The findings indicate that age and employment alone are insufficient to uplift households from the poverty trap in which they find themselves. The MRC’s assessment reveals that a significant portion of the population, despite being above the poverty line, is at risk of falling below. The report suggests that even a slight loss of purchasing power, primarily caused by inflation, can effectively drive a larger segment of the population into poverty. The rising prices of food and housing have forced Iranian households to allocate a larger portion of their budget to these basic needs. Consequently, the educational budget for children in these households has seen a decline of 60 percent, resulting in a higher impact of intergenerational poverty—the perpetuation of poverty from one generation to the next. Tejarat Online, an economic journal, has criticized the MRC’s assessment, questioning the definition of the poverty line. While the MRC sets the income threshold at 4.5 million tumans for 2021–22, the Statistical Center of Iran defines it as 10 million tumans for the same period. Another significant finding from the MRC’s report is that 60 percent of the poor and 61 percent of the non-poor population had an employed head of household in 2020 and 2021. This suggests that the employment status of the heads of households no longer has a significant influence on the poverty status of the households. Iranian families find themselves trapped in a cycle of poverty that does not incentivize the seeking and maintaining of employment, leading to a perplexing employment situation. Analyzing a decade of household biographic data, the MRC shows that while the average age of heads of poor households was higher ten years ago, there is no longer a significant age difference in households over the past two years. This implies that age is no longer a determining factor in the poverty status of households.
Meanwhile, members of Iran’s clerical community are expressing worry that economic problems, among other things, can increase people’s resentment towards the clergy and result in a decline in religiosity. Senior cleric Mohammad-Javad Alavi-Borujerdi says people hold clerics responsible for economic problems even if such problems, like the soaring housing prices or the rise in emigration, have nothing to do with them. Advising authorities to exercise care in decision-making, the reformist-leaning cleric points out that the Nezam’s close connection with the clergy means that major mistakes by the Nezam lead to a loss of status of clerics and religion among the people. His assessment of the decline of public interest in religious ceremonies in the city of Qom is noteworthy. Hardliners, on the other hand, deny loss of interest in religion by pointing to statistics about visits to religious sites or drawing comparisons with the state of religion before the revolution. Hamshahri newspaper, for example, recently dismissed concerns about the growth of irreligiosity as “baseless,” claiming that 2 million Iranians visited the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad during Nowruz. The outlet also referred to “positive” reports by the World Bank to dismiss claims about Iran’s poor economy. Despite such denials, a growing fear is evident among hardliners about the disappearance of visible manifestations of religion and the impact of this phenomenon on the stability of the Nezam. Hasan Rahimpur-Azghadi, a hardline ideologue and member of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, dismisses the growing sentiment about the better state of religiousness prior to the revolution and warns that recent efforts to promote non-observance of hijab are part of an agenda to return Western culture back to Iran.
