Iran appears to be signaling to Western and regional Arab states that it is prepared to engage constructively or act disruptively, based on how it is treated. This stance hinges on whether the region continues to overlook Iran and the West maintains sanctions. This sentiment underscores the intensified rhetoric about potential changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine.
Following Israel’s attack on the Iranian consular building in Damascus and the absence of an expected condemnation from the UN for the assault on a diplomatic site, Iran felt the need to reassert its authority, both domestically and internationally. At the time, conservative outlets raised concerns about restoring Iran’s image of power and importance in the region even among allies like the resistance forces after a series of attacks against Iranian targets. Following Iran’s response to Israel, top Iranian officials began discussing the possibility of altering Iran’s nuclear doctrine in the event of an existential threat or an attack on its nuclear facilities. The ministry of foreign affairs reiterates that Iran’s nuclear doctrine remains unchanged and that the existing fatwa against the use of nuclear weapons is still in effect. However, statements by senior officials like Kamal Kharrazi and IRGC commander Ahmad Haqtalab regarding a possible shift in nuclear policy do not contradict the foreign ministry’s stance. MP Fereidun Abbasi-Davani, former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reiterates that Iran’s nuclear doctrine is adaptable and could change based on circumstances, emphasizing that this serves as a message to the West but is not necessarily indicative of a move toward nuclear weapon production despite Iran’s possession of the necessary materials and technology.
Significantly, the debates around this issue also touch on Iran’s unmet JCPoA expectations. While analysts debate whether such a threatening posture could bring the West back to the negotiating table, the IRGC publication Sobh-e Sadeq argues that as long as other JCPoA parties do not fulfill their obligations, Iran will continue to enhance its nuclear capabilities, regardless of how the IAEA or other nations might interpret these actions. The publication’s insistence on Iran’s commitment to its JCPoA obligations in exchange for sanctions relief may be viewed as a clear signal of readiness to resume negotiations. Moreover, the outlet warns that the escalating regional tensions and Israel’s continued aggression could force Iran to fundamentally reconsider its nuclear strategy. A noteworthy development among some hardline outlets, also affiliated with the IRGC, is a positive shift in tone toward the JCPoA and the need for sanctions relief, even in economic relations with China. New economic engagements with India for the expansion of Chabahar Port and a series of memoranda of understanding between various countries’ economic representatives and the Iranian private sector during the recent Iran Expo 2024 may signify defiance and achievement in the face of sanctions. However, these may also be preparatory steps for economic activities post-sanctions if there is a plan and willingness for such negotiations.
Concurrently, a prevailing narrative is emerging in both official and hardline media outlets, promoting Iran’s pivotal role in fostering peace and stability through enhanced cooperation with regional countries. Nour News, an outlet close to the Supreme National Security Council, recently tweeted that Iranian-Arab engagement could correct negative and baseless perceptions among regional countries and help form a regional order that influences the new world order. This appears to be a response to recent discussions among Arab states and the U.S. about the need for an integrated defense system against Iran, as well as renewed conversations about the normalization of relations with Israel. Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran has not significantly benefited from this reunion, and observers caution that Riyadh may have only extended a gesture of friendship to control Iran when it is time to normalize relations with Tel Aviv.
In Iranian hardline outlets there is a notable emphasis on the idea that Iran’s shift toward regional collaboration or the use of hard power to counter threats depends on regional developments and the presence of Western coalitions. The Jam-e Jam newspaper points out that given the new geopolitical environment in the region and after decades of experiencing ups and downs in its foreign policy, Tehran has concluded that the most effective foreign policy strategy should focus on strengthening regional engagements and neutralizing threats from the region as a way to enhance Iran’s position in balancing regional powers. While reiterating the stance that Iran’s activities in Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan aimed at ensuring national power and sustainable security during turbulent times, the outlet states that Iran’s hard power and military presence can shift to soft presence and increased political influence through connections with regional political groups and maintaining influence in friendly governments. In other words, the outlet seems to be suggesting that as long as Iran’s interests, including the influence of its resistance groups in the formal structure of their respective countries, are ensured, Iran is willing to be a constructive actor. This narrative, evidently aimed at Arab states, and perhaps Western powers as well, aligns closely with Kharrazi’s recent statements that simultaneously offer opportunities for engagement and convey veiled threats.
