A recent telephone conversation between President Ebrahim Ra’isi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during which the Indian leader emphasized enhanced bilateral cooperation has thrust the advancement of Chabahar as a strategic port into the forefront of Iranian media. Analysts are examining whether the development of Chabahar aligns with Iran’s “look to the East.” A fully operational Chabahar port could integrate seamlessly with the Russian-backed International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Conversely, Chabahar’s progress could potentially clash with China’s substantial investment in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, causing Iran to drift away from China’s One Belt, One Road master plan.
Divergent perspectives on Iran’s investment partners for Chabahar have come to light. While Ra’isi, in discussions with Modi, underscored and promoted India’s involvement in Chabahar, Amir Moqaddam, the CEO of the Chabahar free zone organization, highlighted China’s advancement as a partner in shaping Chabahar’s infrastructure. He emphasized that Iran’s other trade partner in Chabahar’s development was China, whose Belt and Road plan focuses on the development of Pakistan’s Gwadar but also has a partial focus on Chabahar. The presence of trans-ocean shipping, such as the first direct line from China to Chabahar alongside diplomatic and economic ties, enhances the likelihood of increased Chinese investment in this port. Referring to reports that China is set to engage in the development of ports in Makran, with negotiations already underway in this regard, Moqaddam said, “With the 13th administration taking office and making efforts to execute the cooperation agreement, China’s investment will predominantly focus on transportation projects, railways, and port construction.” His perspective explains the connection of Chabahar and Jask ports to Pakistan’s Gwadar through the East-West railway line, as part of the Iran-China agreement. This highlights Chabahar’s transformation into a hub within the scope of the Belt and Road initiative. A faction of hardliners appears to advocate prioritizing China over India as a partner in the development of Chabahar. Concerning the development of Chabahar with Indian assistance, Abolfazl Zohrevand, an international affairs analyst with a hardline stance, asserts: “Two factors, America’s influence over India and conflicts with Pakistan, are among the reasons causing India’s reluctance to contribute to Chabahar’s advancement.” Conversely, there is a perspective that does not necessarily view the involvement of China and Pakistan on Chabahar’s development as positive. These arguments suggest they might participate in the project with the intention of impeding its advancement, aiming to counter the economic threat that Chabahar poses to Gwadar. Khabar Online, an outlet close to the moderate conservative Ali Larijani, casts doubt on China’s genuine support for Chabahar’s development, given its substantial investments in the Pakistani port.
Although Iranian media outlets emphasize Chabahar’s role as a crucial hub in the INSTC, they are not content with the current state of Chabahar’s development. The port is not subject to U.S. sanctions, and yet the persistence of sanctions creates uncertainty among Indian transportation stakeholders. This uncertainty could potentially explain the challenges in achieving the intended goals for Chabahar, the North-South corridor, and its connection to another sanctioned country, Russia. Despite the slow and unsatisfactory pace of Chabahar’s development, there is a note of caution in more intricate analyses about China and Pakistan’s involvement. From a reformist perspective in Iran Diplomacy, the proposal by Pakistan to connect Chabahar via rail to Gwadar is seen as enticing and potentially aimed at neutralizing the independence and future prospects of Chabahar. Iran Diplomacy explores this idea because of Gwadar port’s anticipated evolution as a Chinese port in the future, set to be leased to China for long-term economic, political, and military exploitation.
