With the conclusion of the second round of parliamentary elections in 15 provinces, including Tehran, the composition of the Twelfth Majles has become evident, reflecting a conservative majority with significant factional divisions. The ugly clashes in the days leading up to the elections between the two major conservative factions, led by Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf and Ali-Akbar Ra’efipur, have raised concerns among observers across the political spectrum about the consequences of the consolidation of power—a trend some refer to disapprovingly as “purification.” While the polarization of society is an evident result of this trend, there is speculation about how policies may further gravitate towards the demands of the hardliners as a way for the Nezam to retain its minority base of supporters. It remains unclear if the reformists can take advantage of the current conditions to revive their position among the people and in politics.
The latest reviews indicate that the most seats in the Twelfth Majles are held by candidates from Qalibaf’s Coalition Council of Principlists (Persian acronym: SHANA) with 58 seats. Following SHANA, the reformists hold 40 seats. OMANA, consisting of administration allies and another faction known as SHARAYAN, holds the third position with 16 candidates exclusive to it, while the so-called Morning of Iran front, led by Ali-Akbar Ra’efipur, holds 11 exclusive candidates. The fewest exclusive candidates to enter the Twelfth Majles belong to the Unity Council of Islamic Revolution Forces, led by former foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki, with 4 candidates. Notably, the number of independent representatives in this Majles session totals about 100. Nonetheless, observers are uncertain about the possibility of a majority faction taking shape in the Twelfth Majles. Moderate conservative politician Mansur Haqiqatpur envisions three major factions: two conservative factions consisting of forces that cannot work together in one camp, and a third consisting of moderates and reformists. Until 27 May, when the Twelfth Majles begins its work, the political composition of the Majles remains uncertain. However, fierce competition over the speakership continues. Revelations about corruption between pro-Qalibaf and pro-Ra’efipur circles have occasioned concern and alarm among moderately conservative outlets like Frahikhtegan, which describes the ugly rivalry as a degradation of politics. The low participation rate, reportedly 8 percent in Tehran, has alarmed other conservative outlets, which describe the situation as a catastrophe and crisis, blaming it on the purification project. Conservative observers lament the absence of powerful elite figures within the conservative camp who could potentially energize and unite voters.
Concerns are also rising about the return of controversial initiatives such as the so-called Internet protection bill to the Majles. This initiative was originally submitted by ultra-hardliners, but ended up in the hands of the Supreme Cyberspace Council due to its controversial nature. Interestingly, the plan has already been somewhat in effect given the severity of conditions during and after the 2022 protests, but the hardliners in the Majles are looking to revive it once more. Some speculate that Qalibaf has agreed to return the bill to the Majles agenda in exchange for retaining his position as speaker. If true, this adds another layer to speculation about the direction of future policies. With Qalibaf as the fourth-highest vote-getter in Tehran, some believe he no longer enjoys the power and support he once did. This means he will not only have a hard time retaining his position but will also face challenges in maneuvering and directing policies even if he remains the Majles speaker.
On a larger scale, as the level of political participation and support for the establishment drops, the Nezam finds itself with a smaller voter base, which makes it more reliant on its loyal forces, the hardliners. Consequently, it must increasingly meet their demands and cater to their whims. According to reformist analysts, hardliners have gradually gained prominence within the system due to various factors, including the intensification of sanctions following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPoA, the approaching issue of succession, and several rounds of protests that have driven the Nezam increasingly into the arms of these radical forces. In this context, the persistence of the hardliners in their unpopular approaches and the alienation of elites from conservative, moderate, and reformist circles further foment societal polarization and political instability. Some even argue that this polarization may encourage some reformist factions to join the Nezam’s opposition or the camp of the overthrowers. The recent proposition by former Kayhan editor Mehdi Nasiri about a potential alliance between reformists in Iran and monarchists abroad as an alternative to the Islamic Republic, along with the leaked audio file of former President Mohammad Khatami declaring his desire to stand with the people even at the cost of spurning the Nezam, has triggered such concerns. The increasing number of ordinary citizens refusing to participate in elections, reflecting their departure from the current political structure and its values, also raises concern about possible tendencies toward radicalism. The aforementioned audio file contains no indication of Khatami joining anti-revolutionary forces, but the timing of the leak and attempts by certain foreign-based factions to portray it as the reformists’ departure from the Nezam is a matter of concern among reformist thinkers. Nevertheless, while the reformist leaders’ apathy toward political participation remains a serious issue within the camp, some reformist politicians remain optimistic, believing that reformism is still the only viable alternative to the current situation and that the camp can restore people’s trust if given space within the power structure.
