The arrival of the Omani foreign minister in Tehran has sparked significant analysis, with many suggesting that Oman has delivered a message from the United States to Iran. This trip, occurring just days before the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and amidst uncertainty about the political leaning of Iran’s future administration, is noteworthy. However, given the political complexities related to Middle Eastern tensions and the upcoming presidential elections in both Iran and the United States, observers find it unlikely that Tehran-Washington talks will yield a definitive outcome regarding the revival of the JCPoA.
On 27 May, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi traveled to Tehran and met with Ali Baqeri-Kani, the acting foreign minister. The official narrative claimed that al-Busaidi’s visit was to express condolences for former President Ebrahim Ra’isi and the late Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian. Reformist newspapers view this visit with optimism, citing reports of the Biden administration’s alleged efforts to prevent the Europeans’ push for the issuance of an anti-Iran resolution at the IAEA as positive signs of U.S. intentions to revive negotiations with Iran. Meanwhile, the IRGC-affiliated outlet Basirat focuses on interpreting foreign reports about the alleged division between U.S. and European powers over confronting Iran at the IAEA. Skeptical of Western intentions, Basirat suggests that either the Europeans are pressuring the Americans to secure their presence in the Tehran-Washington talks in Muscat or that this alleged division is a “good cop, bad cop” strategy by the U.S. and the E3 to extract more concessions from Tehran. The outlet warns the Iranian foreign ministry to be wary of such Western tactics and asserts that Iran will not cave in to threats, emphasizing that a resolution against Iran would compel it to take further restrictive measures against the IAEA. Basirat reiterates that Iran is prepared to return to its original JCPoA obligations, provided other parties do the same and ensure the lifting of all sanctions.
Given the inflexible expectations from both sides regarding an agreement to revive the JCPoA, as well as regional concerns and electoral priorities in the U.S., some analysts, like reformist-leaning Salaheddin Harsani, believe the Omani official is in Tehran to deliver a broader message from Washington. This message, addressing Iran’s regional activities and support for resistance forces, as well as the nuclear issue, is seen as potentially threatening, but it could also be constructive depending on the political will on both sides. Al-Busaidi’s visit may relate to American concerns about the suspension of talks in Oman following the death of Ebrahim Ra’isi, the transfer of Ali Baqeri-Kani from his position in the nuclear negotiations to acting foreign minister, and the uncertain outlook of Iran’s future administration.
This is where the emergence of reports about the role of Ali Shamkhani, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in overseeing nuclear policy making becomes potentially significant. The news of the transfer of the nuclear dossier to Shamkhani—which the foreign ministry tactfully refused to confirm or deny—may signal assurance to all concerned parties that, regardless of internal developments in Iran including the unclear political leaning of the next administration, the nuclear dossier is managed at a level above the administration. Interestingly, Mahmud Va’ezi, chief of staff during Hasan Rouhani’s second term, revealed that Shamkhani opposed the revival of the JCPoA. He stated that if the secretariat had been aligned with the administration, the JCPoA could have been revived at that time. Some outlets interpreted this revelation as a critique of Shamkhani, triggering speculation that he would never agree to such an agreement because the evasion of sanctions enabled him to profiteer, thereby enriching himself and his family. Shamkhani’s alleged opposition to the JCPoA revival might also relate to his career ambitions or other considerations to prevent Rouhani from taking credit for this significant undertaking—if achieved. Reformist journalist Sara Ma’sumi points out that since Shamkhani’s new appointment as an advisor to the supreme leader three months ago, the timing of the emergence of the news is notable. Ma’sumi suggests that these reports may test the waters for Shamkhani’s potential entrance into the presidential race or indicate a possible change in his position in the new administration. Regardless, like Harsani, Ma’sumi does not expect significant changes in Tehran-Washington talks before the U.S. presidential election. In the best-case scenario, she argues that both sides might only maintain the current status of talks—a stance the Iranian foreign ministry often emphasizes.
