Following the recent agreement between Tehran and Washington concerning the exchange of prisoners and the release of Iran’s frozen assets, there are indications that the positive momentum in Iran-U.S. negotiations will continue, with further progress underway. Despite hardliners’ denial of such an agreement and their insistence on Iran’s ability to counter sanctions through engagement with international pacts like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, observers stress that these diplomatic achievements should not hinder other agreements, such as the JCPoA.
Reformist-leaning outlets continue to monitor signs of de-escalation, which hint at the possibility of an emerging understanding between Tehran and Washington. Analyst Hadi Khosrowshahin, echoing the sentiments of many colleagues, is convinced that the White House has adopted a more lenient approach to enforcing oil sanctions in exchange for Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEA (Daily Summary of 29 August 2023: “Tehran-Washington: Opportunity for Diplomacy?”). However, hardline analysts vehemently reject any such agreement, insisting that, according to American officials’ statements, the U.S. has not relaxed its sanctions. This resistance may reflect a general reluctance towards the idea of an accord with Washington and emphasis on Iran’s capacity to increase oil sales and exports independently. For Khosrowshahin, recent statements by Rafael Grossi regarding the rejection of Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and a reduction in the country’s nuclear capabilities further support his assessment. Examining U.S. domestic considerations regarding the 2024 presidential election, Khosrowshahin suggests that the Biden administration might unveil a series of unofficial agreements with Iran to gauge feedback from its internal political landscape. However, he cautions that if these unofficial agreements persist until November 2024, given the unique dynamics of the Middle East and the nature of Iran’s nuclear program, tensions may resurface in the absence of an official accord. In other words, the passage of time may work against the chances for the revival of the JCPoA. Khosrowshahin views the EU’s favorable tone regarding return to the JCPoA as aligned with this realization. Adding complexity to the situation is the looming October deadline of the JCPoA’s sunset clauses. Discussions about the lifting or reduction of sanctions scheduled to be eased after the October deadline will need to be incorporated into the negotiations, should they resume by then, further complicating the process. Observers recognize the significance of the forthcoming IAEA report, as it will impact decisions regarding Iran’s missile sanctions and more in October. Nevertheless, there is a prevailing sense of optimism in Tehran, notably reflected in a media outlet closely associated with Majles Speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf.
The sense of optimism was also apparent in Friday prayer sermons in a different manner. Friday prayer leaders, in line with the supreme leader’s praise for the Ra’isi administration, proudly touted the major achievements of President Ra’isi’s administration, particularly in the realm of foreign relations. Iran’s accession to BRICS and the SCO took center stage in their commendations for the administration. The prevailing sentiment among the sermons was that the Ra’isi administration, without engaging with the United States or making any concessions to Washington, had successfully facilitated the release of frozen assets. Moreover, they highlighted Iran’s expanded regional alliances, achieved without significant assistance from Europe or America. One imam argued that it was following the BRICS meeting that French President Emmanuel Macron spoke about the imperative of reviving the JCPoA and acknowledged the challenge posed to the current world order. Friday prayer imams also argued that these accomplishments underscore the ineffectiveness of the U.S. sanctions regime and signify the emergence of a new world order in which rising powers like China and Iran wield substantial influence. According to them, the United States has refrained from threatening Iran with war, and the once-common rhetoric of “all options are on the table” has ceased. Friday prayer leaders contended that these diplomatic achievements and regional alliances could address Iran’s economic challenges by opening up new markets for exports and bolstering production levels. Nonetheless, economists argue that banking restrictions, including those stemming from U.S. sanctions and Iran’s non-adherence to the FATF, become even more critical following Iran’s accession to the SCO and BRICS. Khabar Online, a news outlet closely associated with Ali Larijani, diplomatically commends Iran’s strides in breaking free from the U.S.-imposed isolation. However, it highlights a key issue: the SCO, for instance, aligns its regulations on terrorism and financial transactions closely with the FATF’s requirements. Economic experts underscore that SCO membership does not automatically remove Iran from the FATF’s blacklist. Stressing the pivotal role of the JCPoA in dismantling UN sanctions and paving the path for Iran’s accession to the SCO, Khabar Online expresses hope that the Ra’isi administration will shift its perspective. It encourages the administration to view the JCPoA as complementary rather than oppositional to the SCO or BRICS. Such a stance would facilitate the JCPoA’s revival and enable Iran to harness the potential benefits from these two agreements.
