Iran’s goal of becoming an energy and transportation hub faces challenges from competing regional corridors. Warning about regional dynamics that could marginalize Iran’s role in regional transit corridors, the Iranian media stress the importance of the governance of corridors for Iran’s development.
The active policies of Turkey, such as promoting the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur Corridor, are creating an environment in which Iran has to compete. These initiatives aim to connect China to Europe via China’s cultural ties to Central Asia and the transportation corridor between Iraq and Turkey, linking the port of Basra to the Turkish border. The Iranian media have been uneasily observing the growing prominence of these alternative corridors, which are influenced by the geoeconomic forces of the Ukraine conflict, as threatening factors for the expansion and marketing of Iran’s north-south corridor. The hardline Khorasan Daily referred to Iraq’s corridor, connecting the Persian Gulf to Turkey and Europe, as an alternative to the north-south corridor. In a ceremony, Iraq unveiled this alternative corridor, a $17 billion project designed and constructed by Italian and French conglomerates. Khorasan warns about Iraq’s reluctance for nearly two decades to connect its railways to Iran’s, despite the latter being a shorter route of just 30 kilometers and costing only $250 million.
Another significant unfinished infrastructure project is the Zahedan-Chabahar railway. This railway line plays a crucial role in integrating land and sea routes, but its estimated cost of $1.6 billion has not received substantial support from Iranian partners like New Delhi, which is currently grappling with its own financial challenges. Meanwhile, Russia is preoccupied with funding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Both Russia and Iran recognize the benefits of diversifying trade to mitigate the impact of sanctions. Additionally, India holds a strategic interest in the Chabahar project, which aims to encircle the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. However, despite these shared interests, there appears to be insufficient driving force to bring the three countries together.
Reformist media, in the meantime, are expressing concern regarding Turkey’s corridor initiatives, as Turkey places a strong emphasis on corridor governance. The conference Iraq hosted on the development corridor route, initiating the process of connecting the country to Europe through rail and road networks, was also on the radar of reformist media. The objective of this corridor is to establish connections between Europe, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab rail network in the southern Persian Gulf countries. Turkey is also interested in the Caspian Sea border states, particularly the Trans-Caspian route involving Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Moreover, Turkey aims to make Iraq a land and maritime partner with China through the development of a corridor route, creating a new pathway from China to the Middle East, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iraq that bypasses Iran. While Iraq supports the rail connection between Turkey and the Persian Gulf, as well as the Arab rail network, it opposes Iran’s connection to Syria and the Mediterranean coast via Shalamcheh. On Iran’s eastern borders, the Taliban, supported by Qatar and Pakistan, seeks to create instability. Although it may seem like a water resource issue on the surface, according to a reformist outlet’s analysis, the Taliban’s actions might be driven by goals to connect the Middle East to Pakistan via Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the Taliban would allow Iran’s rail connection to Central Asia, but they may have an interest in accessing the Middle East market through Pakistan.
