With every passing year, it seems, the Islamic Republic of Iran is becoming an increasingly unpredictable political entity. Four years ago, the U.S. assassinated Qasem Soleimani, a major Iranian military leader, and the nation’s response was a turnout of Iranians by the tens of millions to memorialize him—according to official figures. Two years ago the country erupted into paroxysms of protest, met with state violence, after a young woman died at the hands of the country’s morality police for failing to meet the country’s standards of hijab, more lax today than ever in the history of the Islamic Republic. And just yesterday, the country’s president, Ebrahim Ra’isi, lost his life, together with Hosein Amir-Abdollahian, his foreign minister, after taking what seemed like an ill-advised helicopter ride in bad weather. (Two other choppers making the same trip arrived safely at their destination.) PersuMedia analysts have sifted through press reports of fast-moving events in Iran to present a snapshot of where the country and its political system stand today. Specifically, they are examining three main trends of great interest, namely, how this will affect the imminent choice of the Nezam’s next supreme leader, how the state will handle the transition to new political leadership, and the anticipated change or non-change to the domestic scene as well as regional and policy.
Potential Impacts on Assembly of Experts, Succession
The death of Ra’isi, along with that of the influential Friday prayer leader of Tabriz, Mohammad-Ali Al-e Hashem, both members of the Assembly of Experts (AoE), will surely impact decision-making within the Assembly and potentially the process of succession when the time comes. The first session of the Sixth AoE is set to meet on 21 May to select its chair and members of the presidium. According to Tasnim, AoE members would have welcomed Ra’isi’s potential chairmanship had he expressed an interest. However, Gholamreza Mesbahi-Moqaddam, a prominent AoE member, suggested that three other senior members—Mohammadreza Modarresi-Mosalla (known as Modarresi-Yazdi), Hashem Hoseini-Bushehri, and the 93-year-old Mohammad-Ali Movahhedi-Kermani—were the main candidates, all with equal chances. Ra’isi had often been discussed as a potential candidate for succession to Ali Khamenei, alongside Khamenei’s second son Mojtaba. Now Ra’isi’s death has understandably triggered speculation on social media about Mojtaba’s increased chances for succession and even conspiracy theories about the organized elimination of potential contenders, including Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Hasan Rouhani. Mojtaba Khamenei still faces challenges such as inadequate scholarly credentials in jurisprudence and the lack of executive experience, as well as the question of hereditary succession—a notion reminiscent of the monarchy, which the Islamic regime has long denounced. Given Ra’isi’s decreasing popularity and his significant underperformance, his chances for succession had been declining. In other words, it is hard to say that Mojtaba’s chances for succession have now increased as a result of Ra’isi’s death. It is noteworthy, however, that Farid Modarresi, a freelance journalist in Qom with deep connections, suggested recently that Modarresi-Yazdi, a hardliner aligned with the mentality of the late Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, is a preferred candidate for succession.
Managing the Unfolding Story and Where We Go from Here
Even before all the facts were known, Khamenei seemed eager to get ahead of the Ra’isi story and signal that he remained in control. For instance, with Ra’isi, Amir-Abdollahian, Al-e Hashem, and East Azarbaijan Governor Malek Rahmati still reported missing on 19 May after their helicopter’s “hard landing,” the supreme leader moved to reassure the country—or rather IRGC personnel—that even in the absence of the “valued” president, the country’s political system would proceed with no disruption. (Social media users interpreted this to mean that Ra’isi’s presence or absence made no difference!) First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber-Dezfuli stepped up as acting president to take charge of a cabinet meeting which, according to reports, arrived at several decisions about management of the crisis. The earliest reports of the presidential chopper going missing were met with denials by state outlets like Fars News, affiliated with the IRGC, which proceeded to add patently false details to the story, such as the presidential entourage proceeding to Tabriz by automobile after their forced landing. Less than an hour later, the official outlet IRNA confirmed that the craft was lost in terrain that was inaccessible by road. Senior officials were also cagey and inconsistent about whether there had been contact with anyone on board the chopper. All of this points to a haphazard effort to control the flow of information, which also served the purpose of absolving anyone of responsibility for the poor decisions that led to the fiasco. As the analyst Mehdi Kharratian noted on his X account, many in authority had a duty to explain how this happened. This drew an exasperated question from Stimson Center distinguished fellow Barbara Slavin: “How can you not know whether he is dead or alive?” It is entirely possible that people high up in the Nezam already knew or strongly suspected that there were no survivors from the chopper, but the drip-drip of conflicting information served to confuse the public and prevent any organized expressions of opposition to the regime.
The next challenge is whether anyone as pliable to Khamenei’s wishes as Ra’isi will emerge from what many analysts acknowledge is the Islamic Republic’s shallow bench (qaht al-rejal). Tellingly, the most prominent potential candidates that have the necessary executive experience are all laypeople, unlike the late Ra’isi. Unless a clerical candidate emerges, the next president, unlike Ra’isi, will not be eligible to succeed Khamenei. The candidates being mentioned most prominently, however, all have ties to the IRGC. Mokhber-Dezfuli, whom many consider to have been the “real” power behind Ra’isi in that he has connections with the supreme leader’s establishment, may be tempted to make himself a candidate in the election that will pick Ra’isi’s successor sometime in the next 50 days, as required by the Constitution. A day before disaster struck, the reformist Hammihan suggested that Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, might challenge for the presidency next year. Whether he is prepared for a more proximate opportunity is an unanswered question at this point, especially as he would face fierce opposition from the Paydari Front and other hardliners on the right. Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf may also feel emboldened to finally make a run for the position after Ra’isi’s preferred candidacy stymied his chances in both 2017 and 2021. After all, his hold on the Majles is shaky since his poor showing in the March ballot. As for who will take over for Amir-Abdollahian, his deputy Ali Baqeri-Kani, Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator and another Khamenei insider, has been declared acting foreign minister. The five-day official period of mourning that Khamenei declared is expected to keep in check political battles among the various factions and forces, but soon the gloves are likely to come off in the contest for power.
Policy Directions: Continuity or Change?
On 21 May, Amir-Abdollahian was slated to attend in Kazakhstan the first meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs since Iran’s admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. That was before fate intervened. The headline from Javan the day before the meeting read: “Our Martyred Minister, Amir-Abdollahian, Will be Missed There.” The outlet credited Ra’isi and Amir-Abdollahian for Iran’s membership in Shanghai and BRICS and for providing the Islamic Republic with an alternative to relations with the West. “Would there be major policy changes without Ra’isi and Amir-Abdollahian at the helm?” is a legitimate question, but one that pundits might not have had the chance to address just yet. The indications, however, are all about continuity and stability. Abolfazl Amu’i, the spokesperson of the Majles national security and foreign policy committee, characterized the deceased foreign minister as a proactive supporter of the Axis of Resistance and the Palestinian people. Amir-Abdollahian during his tenure, said Amu’i, was entirely in line with Iran’s IRGC and intelligence forces. Ra’isi also came in for praise for his steadfast devotion to the supreme leader and the station of velayat. Eqtesad News published an article about Ra’isi’s foreign policy approach from press outlets in China, India, the UK, and the United States to conclude that Iran’s Eastward approach and its rapprochement with neighboring Arab countries would be central to support for the Axis of Resistance. Given Ra’isi’s track record as a devotee of the supreme leader, it is hard to believe that his replacement could be very different, at least in terms of steadfast obedience to Khamenei and his directives.
