Iran’s hardliners have generally stood behind the Ra’isi administration’s orientation towards the East, but now some are grumbling that it is being implemented loosely and proving ineffective as a policy. In short, they consider Iran’s foreign policy doctrine lacking in sophistication and multilateralism, which takes away the country’s ability to respond effectively to the region’s rapid evolution.
Iran is being compared to Turkey, which is benefiting from its positioning in the Ukraine conflict, and to China, which is managing to keep its major adversary, the United States, as its primary trade partner. By contrast, Iran’s East-focused strategy has produced few substantial results. Even hardline analysts are now acknowledging that Iran’s approach is outdated, sluggish, and binary in nature, rendering it ill-equipped to navigate the complexities of today’s international relations. A shared viewpoint regarding the practicality and effectiveness of the “look to the East” has brought together three hardliners: Mehdi Kharratian, director of the Policy Revival Center, Hamed Vafa’i, professor of Chinese literature and director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Tehran, and Majid Shakeri, an economist. The three came together on a justice-seeking platform to express their reservations regarding Iran’s eastern orientation. Shakeri posits that Iran’s higher leadership fails to grasp the behaviors of other nations. He highlights China’s investment in the Iranian transportation infrastructure, specifically in the city of Sarakhs in the east, to illustrate that this move aligns with the Asian giant’s broader policy of diversifying land routes to the West and sending a message to Moscow. The Nezam, however, loses out on opportunities to pursue its interests optimally due to its inability to decipher actions and discern underlying motivations. Shakeri questions the feasibility of Iran’s Eastward turn, wondering how such a simplified binary approach to foreign policy can effectively accommodate simultaneous relations with Russia, China, and India as Eastern powers. He also criticizes Iranian policymakers for misinterpreting India’s geopolitical stance, mistaking its geographical location for its political alignment within global power blocs.
Vafa’i contrasts China’s economic perspective with Russia’s security-oriented approach, highlighting the dichotomy that has led to conflicts even within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to him, Iran remains vulnerable to the repercussions of these conflicting interests. Delving into Iran’s SCO membership, Vafa’i underscores the significance of “mutual non-commitment,” an element that China has incorporated into the organization’s charter to distinguish it from NATO’s doctrine requiring all members to come to the defense of a member nation under attack. Vafa’i clarifies that the SCO emphasizes shared economic interests and investments, not defense, as foundational elements for security and deterrence. Both Shakeri and Vafa’i believe the China-Russia partnership is not sustainable in the long run given their disagreements in the military and security spheres. Russia, for instance, is a major supplier of military hardware to India, which has unresolved border disputes with China and historical enmity with Pakistan, which receives armaments from China. Russia harbors its own security concerns over China’s presence in its eastern regions, and the competition between the two also spills over in arms sales to the Persian Gulf and Africa. Kharratian, likewise, highlights Russia’s involvement in India’s nuclear program and China’s potential sponsorship of Pakistan’s nuclear endeavors. He contends that Iranian institutions, think tanks, security agencies, and the administration lack data-driven analytical capabilities, leading to Iran’s misinterpretation of global developments.
Shakeri underscores the importance of understanding China’s choice of trade partners, believing that if Iran could understand this, it could make itself more appealing for increased trade and investment. Asserting that Iran has not effectively communicated to China its resilience against Western pressure, which could have allayed China’s economic concerns over bilateral relations, he characterizes Iran’s foreign policy as outdated, resulting in prolonged sanctions and the greater impoverishment of a significant portion of Iranians. Vafa’i, the Chinese literature expert, points out the misconception of simultaneously envisioning a military alliance with both China and Russia. He draws attention to historical differences and rivalries between these powers, particularly in Central Asia. Drawing a contrast with Iran, he portrays the international relations approach of China, India, and Turkey as adaptable, flexible, and multifaceted, allowing those countries to maintain a delicate equilibrium in their interactions with competing global forces. He concludes, “Iran needs to engage intelligently in comprehensive interactions with various global power centers.” Curiously, deviations from a balanced foreign policy have consistently resulted in actions that run counter to Iran’s national interests. This lack of consistent principles, irrespective of whether they are aligned with conservative or reformist ideologies, is evident.
