While initial Iranian reports underscored Saudi Arabia’s desire to break the deadlock and Iran’s aim to improve conditions for Hajj pilgrims, the recent reopening of embassies and Foreign Minister Hosein Amir-Abdollahian’s meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) suggest a shift in focus. The new emphasis in the official narrative appears to be forging sustainable bilateral cooperation, enhancing security and development for all, and fostering indigenous regional security. Acknowledging potential challenges like the disputes over the Arash/Al-Durra joint gas field and Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel, observers advise that a flexible approach—as opposed to the traditional “revolutionary” attitude—could help Iran effectively navigate this evolving regional landscape.
Conservative outlet Rahbord-e Mo’aser suggests that other players like China, Qatar, and Oman could mediate in the disputes over the joint gas field (see China’s stance in the Daily Summary of 17 August 2023: “Hopes, Concerns for Relations with Riyadh”). In what seems to be an effort to draw attention to the broader context and the significance of Tehran-Riyadh relations, writer Ali Nejat points out that disputes over joint oil and gas fields are a recurrent theme in the region, emphasizing that Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have successfully resolved similar conflicts in the past. Former diplomat Mohammad-Hosein Mala’ek argues that if Iran adopts a progressive approach and prioritizes its national interests, the joint gas field will not pose a challenge. According to Mala’ek, in terms of the balance of power, Iran is currently in a relatively decent place and Hezbollah is gradually rewriting the rules on the northern borders of Israel. Against this backdrop, he contends that assisting Saudi Arabia in achieving a more balanced relationship with the U.S. and Israel could prove advantageous for Tehran, fostering expanded collaboration between the two nations. Mala’ek underscores that adopting an approach aligned with national interests allows for defining various strategies with Saudi Arabia, even while maintaining revolutionary positions such as support for Palestine, confronting Israel, and reducing the presence of the U.S. in the region. In this context, one may see Amir-Abdollahian’s visit with MBS and his reference to Palestine as a central concern for Muslims while characterizing Israel as a common threat as nothing more than a passing remark—a box that had to be checked as part of the usual talking points. Along the same lines, reformist-leaning analyst Rahman Qahramanpur emphasizes the importance of a policy that aims to create a power balance, which requires an approach that ensures Israel’s warming relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not disrupt their engagements with Iran. Pointing to “real challenges” like the Saudis’ normalization of relations with Israel and even Turkey’s growing economic relations with Arab nations, Qahramanpur contends that the next steps in expanding relations with Saudi Arabia are going to be hard—especially when Iran is now compelled to consider China’s concerns in its calculations as well. Nonetheless, the analyst does not think that the Islamic Republic has a clear policy for the future of its relations with the Saudis or the Emiratis.
Some hardliners’ comments continue to reflect a perspective that perceives Tehran’s evolving relations as a source of disappointment for Israel and a move towards isolating Tel Aviv. Nonetheless, the prevailing optimism is rooted in the belief that this amicable atmosphere could redefine the concept of “security” within the region, thereby obviating the necessity for a foreign military presence and bases. Arab analysts, engaged with the Iranian-owned Arabic news channel al-Alam, assert that the Tehran-Riyadh relationship is robust, underpinned by a novel strategy centered on peace, ultimately contributing to a diminished U.S. role in the region.
